Chapter 337: Answer
The Japanese army also had another trouble in the Mariana Islands, that is, the Mariana Islands were originally garrisoned by the Japanese Navy, but now the Japanese Army has been transferred to garrison, and the Japanese Army and the Navy are not compatible in the first place, so they do not buy each other's accounts......
When he was also chief of staff, he also swore that he could lead all the armies by himself and unite them, but in the blink of an eye, such a problem arose in the Mariana Islands. Pen × fun × Pavilion www. biquge。 info
And it's a serious problem.
There are five main islands to defend in Marianas: Guam, Rota, Tinian, Saipan and Pagan from south to north.
These islands were all large in size, and the eleven airfields of the Japanese army were spread over five islands...... Two of these airports were built only as emergency airports due to insufficient materials and equipment.
Therefore, in the allocation of army defense, it was necessary to disperse the army to these islands, with the general headquarters located in the middle and the second largest island in terms of area (Guam was the largest in the first area).
In this way, a problem will inevitably arise: the rank of naval and army officers on each island is not high...... Some islands have a higher rank of naval officers, while some islands have a higher rank of army officers, so who is under whose command?!
The Navy said...... We must listen to the navy, because we are more familiar with naval warfare and landing warfare, how can those dirt buns of the army know what sea and air coordination is!
However, the army said that it must listen to the army, and when the Americans go ashore, they will fight a land war, and our military rank is high, so why should we listen to the low military rank if we have a high rank?
In the end, there was no choice, Vice Takeshi Toyoda could only order: "Each island is subject to military rank, and the military rank is higher than the commander of the island!" ”
This may seem like a fair and useful approach, but it raises new questions...... Some islands are commanded by the navy and some by the army.
In other words, there are two command systems on the five islands of the Mariana Islands alone, and these two command systems have not yet been systematically intertwined, and when the command headquarters in Saipan wants to issue an order to a certain island, it must first check whether the island is under the command of the army or the navy.
As a result, the defenses of the Mariana Islands were fragmented in one formation.
Lieutenant General Gao Pinbiao, commander of the 29th Division and commander of the Mariana Islands Army, once reported this problem to Vice Toyoda, but Vice Toyoda did not take this matter to heart.
The reason is that Toyoda knows that the core of this battle is not the island defense of the Mariana Islands...... If the war is fought when the US military can carry out an all-out island landing operation, then there is no hope of holding the Mariana Islands, and no matter how elite the troops stationed on the islands are, no matter how good their command is, it will not help.
This idea of Toyoda Vice Takeshi is right, island operations are not the same as inland operations...... In inland operations, when losing sea and air superiority, you can continue to survive and fight a protracted war by virtue of the depth of defense, and you can even carry out interspersed encirclement and break through to the enemy's rear.
But the island war...... The enemy's rear is the sea, and the troops on the islands can never be interspersed, and the islands have no depth to speak of, so they simply cannot survive without supplies, so they cannot fight a protracted war.
As a result, Deputy Toyoda simply left the island's defense chaotic and weak and focused on the organization and preparation of the sea and air forces, which also caused the Mariana Islands to have almost no artillery bunkers, mines and barbed wire, and the overall defense was not strong at all.
In terms of the organization of the Navy and Air Force, Deputy Toyoda and Ryunosuke Kusaka agreed that the main force of the flight division must be placed on the aircraft carrier.
The reason is that the United States is very likely to bomb the airfields on the islands at the first opportunity, and if the main force of the flight division is placed on the islands, it is very likely that the United States will destroy them before they can take off.
Therefore, except for some land-based fighters that cannot take off and land on aircraft carriers, most of the fighters are placed on eight aircraft carriers.
The airfields on the islands were modeled in advance to confuse the U.S. military.
The idea of Toyoda Vice Takeshi and Kusaka Ryunosuke was...... When the US aircraft carriers bomb the island airfields as usual, the position of the aircraft carriers will be exposed, and then the Japanese fighters will pour out to catch the US Navy by surprise. If it can, it will be able to take out two or three US aircraft carriers in the first place and inflict heavy damage on the US Navy.
At this time, the Japanese army was faced with another embarrassing problem, that is, there was a serious shortage of destroyers and frigates to escort these eight aircraft carriers.
In the end, Vice Takeshi Toyoda had no choice but to give up the flagship Musashi to the combat troops, and he raised the flag of the commander of the Combined Fleet on the light cruiser "Oyodo", which was less than 10,000 tons, that is to say, the "Oyodo" became the flagship of the Combined Fleet.
On the surface, this is a small thing, but it is actually quite small.
Since the Japanese army had the Combined Fleet in 1894, "Matsushima", "Mikasa", "Shikishima", "Asahi", "Kongo", "Yamashiro", "Nagato", "Mutsu", "Yamato", "Musashi", the flagship of the Combined Fleet has always been the largest warship of the Combined Fleet, which is the spirit of the Japanese Combined Fleet, the pillar of the Combined Fleet, the spirit of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the pillar of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
But now...... This spirit was no longer reliable, this pillar was already crumbling, and the Combined Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy finally knew about this fact.
It should be said that they finally admitted this fact, because they actually knew it after the battle of Guadalcanal, but they have been lying to others and themselves all along.
At that time, the principal of the Japanese Naval Academy named Inoue Narumi put forward a suggestion: "Battleships should not be repaired, heavy cruisers should not be repaired, and manpower and financial resources should be concentrated to repair aircraft carriers, light cruisers, and destroyers."
This suggestion was clearly correct, because at that time it was already proven that the era of "cannon giants" had passed, and battleships and heavy cruisers were really just a show...... They require a lot of resources to maintain in peacetime, and they can play a role not much bigger than destroyers in wartime, and they can even become a good target for the enemy's air force.
As a result, these ships are not repaired or repaired, so that the few resources that are used on more useful aircraft carriers, light cruisers and destroyers.
But this suggestion was scoffed at in Japan at the time, and everyone felt that it was ...... Does the Japanese Navy need such savings?
Now, when Toyota's vice president takes the "Oyodo" light patrol as the flagship, it gives everyone a positive answer.
(To be continued.) )