(456) No wind does not làng

"The dangers conceived in the study are judged in order of their seriousness and necessity as follows: 1. Bombing by aircraft; 2. Aircraft launch torpedoes to attack, 3. Destruction of ports; 4. Submarine attacks; 5. Mine attacks, 6. Shelling by warships. In addition to the first and second dangers mentioned above, the other dangers have been satisfactorily defended, so the main discussion in the study is to deal with the first and second dangers. In my opinion, both of these attacks could have been carried out by aircraft carriers and the ships that reinforced them behind them. The enemy may use up to twelve squadrons of air for attack, and at least two squadrons. Therefore, as a way to deal with the first two dangers, I propose the following methods:

1. Detect and attack enemy aircraft carriers and their reinforcing ships before an air strike:

2. Detect and shoot down enemy aircraft before they reach the bombing target;

3. Use anti-aircraft artillery fire to repel enemy aircraft;

4. Artificial smoke screens are used to cover up important facilities;

5. Set up balloon blocking nets to protect important facilities.

With regard to strengthening the defense of Pearl Harbor to meet the needs of the situation, I make the following recommendations:

First, the War Department should give the highest priority to increasing the number of fighter jets and high-altitude artillery in Hawaii and to establishing an air defense warning system;

2. In order to improve the defense of Pearl Harbor, the War Department should consider the use of balloon blocking nets, smoke screens, and other special devices there;

3. Draw up a plan for coordinated operations on the spot, so that in the event of a surprise attack by enemy aircraft, the Navy and the Army, ships and ground forces will cooperate effectively in air combat and anti-aircraft firepower;

4. Agree that the Army and Navy forces on Oahu shall make appropriate preparations to defend against enemy aircraft attacking Pearl Harbor;

5. As long as the current unstable situation continues, the army and navy forces on Oahu must conduct joint exercises at least once a week to prepare for an attack by an opposition. ”

"I also think that Japan may attack without warning, and that this attack may take various forms: either by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags, or by submarines posing as German or Italian. In addition, a Japanese attack may have been aimed at ships, far from U.S. territory or naval forces, or it could have made a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or blockaded its harbors. ”

When the letter was delivered to Stimson, it was located in a white building in Akasaka, Tokyo, inside the U.S. Embassy. Joseph, known as a "Japanese expert"? Gru, who has been the owner of the building since 1932. At this moment, he was leaning back in an easy chair in the ambassador's office, listening intently to the nervous conversation of the first secretary, Klock. What Klock talked about was told to him by the Peruvian minister to Japan, Shuriba, who had close ties to the Japanese upper class. When Gru heard the report, he was taken aback by its contents, and at the same time could not easily believe it. So he hurriedly called Navy Attache Smith Hatton and asked him what he thought.

"I think it's just street rumors."

"But as the saying goes, you can't afford to làng without wind!"

"I don't believe it anyway."

"Anyway, let's report to Washington!"

Gru took what he heard as one of the most important pieces of information and drafted a telegram to the sender, and this startling cipher was sent at 6 p.m. that day.

"Top Secret Telegram No. 125

Secretary of State:

The Peruvian Minister to Japan informed the staff of our embassy that he had been informed by many, including the Japanese, that the Japanese army was planning to use all its military forces to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in the event of an incident between Japan and the United States. He also added that this plan seems to have no basis, but because it was heard from many sources, this information was conveyed to you. “…,

For Ambassador Gru, this seems like an incredible plan. That night, while thinking about the exceptional telegram he had sent to the State Department, Gru wrote in his diary: "I hope that our officers and soldiers in Hawaii will not rest easy. ”

Unbeknownst to Gru, he heard this "street rumor" twenty days after Yamamoto wrote to Kazukawa Kaixiang about the historic Hawaiian battle scenario, and Yamamoto's letter to Kazukawa Kaixiang was extremely secret. Outside the text, he wrote in a red pen: "It is for His Excellency the Minister to read alone, and please burn it immediately after reading." Therefore, it is indeed difficult to imagine where this secret came from to make it a "street rumor".

If it's not "the walls have ears", then what's going on?

In fact, the reason for this happened was that the Taranto incident was reported in detail by Japanese newspapers, and this incident also caused a great shock to the Japanese Navy. Therefore, among the "street strategists" who cared about the navy, an idea arose: "What the British Navy can do, the Japanese Navy can do." "It's inconceivable. They exaggerated it to the point that "the Japanese army would attack Pearl Harbor at the beginning of the war."

The U.S. Department of State sent a copy of Ambassador Gru's message to the U.S. War Department and the U.S. Department of the Navy, requesting that the Directorate of Naval Intelligence decipher the contents of the telegram and provide comments. The experts' opinion was that what the Peruvian Minister to Japan said was purely "fictitious". However, Chief of Naval Operations Stark advocated that the telegram should be taken to Pearl Harbor for reference anyway, and ordered that the message be attached to the end of the telegram with the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel McCallum, chief of the Far East Section of the Marine Intelligence Bureau. The telegram reached the commander of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February: "The summary of the telegram sent by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan to the State Department on 27 January is hereby notified below for reference. …… The US Naval Intelligence Agency does not consider such rumors credible. Judging by the information available to us regarding the current disposition and operations of the Japanese army and navy, we do not believe that its operation at Pearl Harbor is imminent, nor does it appear that such a plan exists in the foreseeable future. ”

At this time, on the calm waters of Pearl Harbor, which is always summer, the new and former commanders of the US Pacific Fleet are solemnly holding a jiāo receiving ceremony on the aft deck of the flagship "Pennsylvania" under the long barrel of the 406-millimeter caliber triple main gun. Commander Richardson stepped down, and he was replaced by Hirschbend? Commander Kimmel will be tasked with commanding a large fleet in the turbulent Pacific Ocean to defend the security of his homeland.

Originally, Richardson's strategic judgment was: from the current state of the world, ensuring the Western Hemisphere is indispensable for the security of the United States; To be involved in the Pacific War was a major mistake. Even from a purely naval strategic point of view, the stationing of the fleet in Hawaii has a number of disadvantages. Richardson believed that the Pacific Fleet was not only at a disadvantage compared with the Japanese fleet, but also that it was not fully prepared in terms of combat readiness, either in terms of manpower or material resources. He expressed doubts that the strength of such a fleet alone would have the effect of deterring Japan from taking action.

Based on the above views, Richardson has always advocated the return of the Pacific Fleet to the West Coast of the United States, which is convenient for reorganization, replenishment, and training. And this proposition is one of the biggest reasons why he stepped down from the post of commander of the Pacific Fleet.

For Commander Kimmel, the ceremony of taking over the post of commander on this day was the proudest moment of his life, his eyes shining brightly, and his entire facial expression was full of hope for the future.

However, in the days following his appointment, Kimmel inspected the situation at the Pacific Fleet and the Pearl Harbor base, and found that the situation was not encouraging. …,

Not so long ago, Secretary of the War Stimson wrote a reply letter to Secretary of the Navy Knox in response to his question about the enemy's surprise attack on the fleet and naval base at Pearl Harbor. Stimson begins his letter with the words: "In view of the seriousness of the problem, and in order to deal with this hostility, I fully agree that we should at once make the best possible preparations. He went on to assure that "the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority." But was the defense of Pearl Harbor really given "the highest priority" and realized, as Stimson had assured?

Secretary of the Navy Knox emphasized strengthening the defense of Pearl Harbor, and Secretary of War Stimson "fully agreed" with Knox's opinion that Pearl Harbor should be supplemented with at least the minimum necessary if not all the requirements of the local commanders. However, contrary to what was stated in the letters between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army, Pearl Harbor's defense capability was still extremely weak.

The Hawaiian Army was originally planned to have 180 B17 aircraft, but only 12 were actually available, of which only six could be used for patrol duty. The local commander asked for 300 seaplanes, but in reality only 50 were equipped, and the remaining 250 were due to President Roosevelt's adviser Harry? Hopkins' political influence, which was transferred to the British. In this way, if you want to patrol a 360-degree circle every day, the patrol capacity of the Pearl Harbor base is only limited to two or three days!

In addition, although the six mobile radars scheduled for Pearl Harbor had already arrived, they were not skilled in using them because of the short time they were used, and they did not believe in the role of the radars. As a result, the radar is rendered useless. Of the six fixed radars scheduled for Pearl Harbor, only three were shipped and are still being installed and cannot be used.

On the same day that Stimson replied to Knox, the senior adjutant of the U.S. Department of the Army sent a copy of the Secretary of the Admiralty's letter to the Secretary of the Army and a copy of the Secretary of the Army's reply to the Hawaiian Army, informing him that "we should cooperate with the local naval authorities to make the means of mutual defense effective." On the naval side, Stark, the chief of operations, forwarded copies of the letters exchanged between the two ministers to Commander Kimmel of the Pacific Fleet and Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii) Bullock.

Commander of the 14th Naval Military Region, Bullock, and Army Commander Short of the Hawaiian side, in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Hawaiian Army and Navy aircraft and improve the effectiveness of defending against enemy aircraft, established a joint committee on air combat, communications, air defense, chemical warfare, and weapons at an early stage. The exchange of letters between the two Secretaries of the Army and Navy led to agreements and plans between the Hawaiian Army and Navy forces to defend the area centered on Pearl Harbor and to secure the fleet.

On the very day that Stark delivered copies of the letters exchanged between the two ministers to Kimmel on February 11 (formerly known as Anno Day), Chief of Naval Operations Stark sent a classified document dated February 17 to the commanders of the naval districts, ordering them:

"It is necessary to investigate and study the issue of using anti-torpedo devices to protect the harbors in the area under their jurisdiction, especially to protect large ships anchored in the main bases of the fleet, and to give opinions."

In this document, Stark said: "Just because a ship is anchored in the waters of Depth 1 does not assume that it is safe from torpedo bombers." He added to the document: "Most of the torpedoes fired by British aircraft carriers (carrier-based aircraft) in the Battle of Taranto were between 1 and 1 fathoms, and only a few torpedoes were between 11 fats (20 meters) and even 12 fathoms." "The commander of the Hawaiian Army, Vice Admiral Short, informed his fellow units that, in order to maximize the preparation of aircraft in the Hawaiian area, they were advised to draw up detailed plans for the following areas, in accordance with the Joint Defense Plan for the Seas off the Hawaii Coast, jointly drawn up by the Hawaiian Army and the Fourteenth Naval District, on April 14, 1939:

joint air exercises;

Communication;

shared use of airports,

identification of aircraft;

vigilance and duty;

provide aircraft with various types of ammunition and other equipment;

alerting and detecting enemy aircraft;

Use balloons to block nets and smoke screens:

the addition of fighter jets and high-profile guns as well as the equipping of anti-aircraft alerts;

Army and Navy aircraft take combat action against air strikes by enemy aircraft, effectively adjusting ships and ground air defense weapons;

Army and Navy forces conduct joint exercises at least once a week aimed at defending against air attacks by enemy aircraft.

Kimmel then wrote in a detailed report to Chief of Naval Operations Stark on the current state of the Pacific Fleet: "I think that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (with submarines or planes, or both) is possible. In order to minimize the damage caused by such a surprise attack and to inflict heavy damage on the invading enemy, I am taking swift and practical measures. ”

The local commanders in Hawaii were less concerned than Washington with anti-torpedo netting to protect ships anchored in Pearl Harbor from torpedoes. In a letter to Secretary Stark, Commander Kimmel said: "I recommend that you do not supply Pearl Harbor with anti-torpedo nets until such equipment is developed that it is simple and effective, that it can be adapted to the needs of an emergency, and that it can be set up quickly." "In addition, Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii), Bullock, in his report to Secretary Stark, also recommended that anti-torpedo nets not be installed for the following reasons: (1) the water depth at the Pearl Harbor mooring area should not exceed 45 feet, and (2) the navigation of ships entering and exiting the anchorage area would be restricted; 3. Most of the anchorage area is close to the main channel, where submarine cables and pipelines are laid; Fourth, the relevant devices to protect the fleet's berths will seriously affect the passage of ships on the shipping lanes.

A week later, Stark wrote to Kimmel asking him to "not neglect the study of air strikes on Japanese cities that are prone to fire, ostensibly against military targets," as he drew up his Pacific Fleet battle plan. At the same time, he explained the reason: "Such an attack will affect the morale of the Japanese people and may be able to contain the military action of the Japanese army." Stark then added, "It may be considered inappropriate to take such a risk, but in any case (and it is strictly confidential), you and I may be ordered to do so." So, I hope you think about your plans in this regard. ”

Needless to say, this was "ordered" by the US president, commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy.

Stark made a point of saying this in his letter, probably in consideration of President Roosevelt's reference to the U.S. Global Strategic Approach: "The Navy should consider the possibility of bombing Japanese cities." ”

Although the Americans are also preparing intensively, they do not know that they are far from their opponents.

As the international situation became increasingly tense, some of the Japanese naval vessels that had been reorganized were immediately incorporated into the Combined Fleet. While conducting actual combat training and basic exercises, the Japanese Combined Fleet assembled in Tokyo Bay.

At this time, Minoru Minakasa, Minoru Genda, a staff officer of Japan's First Air Force, had already taken out the specific plan for the surprise attack in the officer's dormitory of the "Pancheng" aircraft carrier.

Ever since Rear Admiral Takakijiro Onishi, Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Force, had secretly commissioned him to conduct a preliminary study of Commander Yamamoto's plan for an attack on Hawaii, he had been using the time spent by the officers and men of the USS Panjo to bury their heads in the study. After thinking about it, he finally came up with a plan easily.

Genda's plan was: In order to achieve a complete victory in the offensive, it was necessary to carry out bombing in turns, not one bombing. At that time, because the hit rate of horizontal bombing was not high, and the technical problem of "shallow water torpedoes" (Pearl Harbor was 12 meters deep) could not be solved immediately, carrier-based bombers carried out dive bombing, with aircraft carriers as the first target and capital ships as the second target. The ships that were put into battle were the "Pancheng" and "Tenryu" aircraft carriers (the First Air Force), the "Soryu" and "Hiryu" (the Second Air Force), and the "Zuizuru" and "Shozuru" (the Third Air Force), which were large ships and air carriers owned by Japan at that time. The departure base is tentatively Chichijima (Ogasawara Islands) or Akkeshi (Hokkaido). The attack fleet waited for the aircraft carriers to approach Hawaii for 200 nautical miles before taking off.

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