The second more

At a time when the EU is in turmoil, Yanayev and Ryzhkov are discussing the second round of agricultural product reform, which has already achieved the desired results by using agricultural cooperation policies to reduce foreign labor costs. Now Yanayev intends to embark on agricultural reforms after a further economic turnaround. Because the agrarian reform had to be financially supported by the central government, Yanayev did not begin this far-reaching project until the end of 1996.

As the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, the opinion of Ryzhkov, who served as finance minister, was particularly important. And as one of the formulators of the reform program, Ryzhkov had more say in the economic field than others, which is why he was selected by Yanayev to become one of the important chairing members of the Agrarian Reform Committee.

The conference brought together almost all the powerful figures in the Soviet agricultural sector.

Yanayev stretched out his hand and motioned to Ryzhkov, who was sitting next to him, to begin to express his opinion, "After the turmoil of 1991, China's total agricultural GDP began to show a steady growth trend from 1993 to 1996, which partly reflects the effectiveness of the Soviet Union's agricultural reform policy, but on the whole, after the stable development of reform, it has also exposed some deficiencies in some aspects. For example, there is a large gap in the level of market price support we provide for different agricultural products, and the negative price support faced by the food sector has led to a series of problems such as uneven distribution of internal resources. Moreover, a higher level of protection can lead to distortion of price signals in the international market, so it is easy to become the focus and difficulty of international multilateral trade negotiations. ”

After Ryzhkov finished saying this, Yanayev expressed his opinion on the overall situation of the next presiding reform, and the Soviet Union became a net importer of grain from 1975, and grain imports surged. In 1970, the net export was 3.5 million tons, in 1974 the import and export of grain was flat, and in 1975 the import of tens of millions of tons. In 1984, only 26.8 million tonnes of grain were imported from the United States and Canada. In 1986-1988, there was a shortage of about 21 billion rubles. And also in the case of food production with a total volume of 136 billion rubles. In addition to importing large quantities of grain, for example, in 1989 it imported 600,000 tons of meat, 240,000 tons of cream, 1.2 million tons of vegetable oil, 5.5 million tons of sugar, and 500,000 tons of citrus.

Then from the early to mid-80s of the 20th century, neither Soviet economists nor the leadership of political decision-making made a corresponding assessment of the consequences of the USSR's involvement in the integration of the world economy. Thus, in 1980-1982, when the world economy experienced successive recessions accompanied by falling oil prices, no one in the Soviet Union foresaw the catastrophic consequences of this situation for the Soviet foreign trade and foreign exchange financial system. Economists have long observed that the decline in the planned economic growth rate in the Soviet Union went from 6% in the 50s and 4% in the 70s to 3 to 3.5% in the 80s. The Soviet economy continued to grow at a rate of declining or even stagnant growth for 20-30 years.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 consisted of distorted industrial development, the strategic policy of the United States, the deformities of the Soviet Union's own agricultural development, and the mistakes of the oil strategy. That is why Yanayev is so concerned about the agricultural development of the Soviet Union itself, and strives to adjust the agricultural structure to a status quo of self-sufficiency without relying on foreign imports.

From the beginning of the Soviet Union to the present, the problem of agricultural output has never been solved, and the situation of relying on large quantities of imported grain has never changed. Even in 2015, Russia still needs to import 40 percent of its agricultural products.

"First of all, credit and tax incentives: the Soviet Union has always directly supported facilities and investments by roughly two-thirds of its budget for producer support, mostly in the form of low interest rates on credit. The credit preference situation is subsidized by bank lending rates. And the scope and scale are constantly expanding. Among the initial results, the short-term loans have been expanded to medium- and long-term loans, and the beneficiaries have been expanded to cover all producers, including rural households and production cooperatives. Concessional loan support is the direct transfer of loans to borrowers, and the subsidized interest rate depends on the refinancing rate of the government's financial sector. The preferential tax treatment mainly includes the preferential policy of unified tax on agriculture and the preferential policy of value-added tax on agricultural products. ”

"Flat tax on agriculture?" Ryzhkov asked puzzled.

"Yes, the unified tax on agriculture, for the reform of the agricultural tax, I will give a detailed answer later." Yanayev motioned to Ryzhkov to calm down and wait for him to explain the new tax.

The Unified Tax on Agriculture was introduced in Russia in 2003, and agricultural enterprises can choose to adopt a unified tax on agriculture or keep the original tax system. Enterprises that adopt the unified agricultural tax can get exemption from income tax, property tax, social tax bill, value-added tax and other benefits.

"The limitation of the maximum price and the minimum price, the regulation and control of the agricultural product circulation market through the policy of grain market price intervention, and the regulation and stabilization of domestic agricultural product prices by setting the minimum and maximum prices and adopting the methods of state procurement intervention and state commodity intervention. State intervention is when the government restricts food imports by reducing supply to close the demand gap when food prices fall in the market. And from the budget allocated measures for the purchase of surplus grain on the market. State commodity intervention, on the other hand, is a measure taken by the government to alleviate the shortage of food by restricting grain exports and putting grain reserves on the market in order to expand supply when food prices rise in the market. And establish corresponding intervention price ranges for different grains. ”

"The most important point is the high protection policy at the border. The USSR was an importer of agricultural products trade, and implemented a policy of high border protection through market access, customs duties and phytosanitary protection. Soviet producers supported the realization of transfer payments through the purchase of products at higher prices than international for domestic consumption. ”

Yanayev's agrarian reform policy can be seen as a fusion version of Russian agrarian reform and Chinese market reform, on the one hand, trade barriers are implemented according to their own national conditions, and on the other hand, the "wool" sheared from trade barriers is used to support the development of domestic agriculture in order to form the market competitiveness of domestic agricultural products.

I have to say that the last move was indeed vicious.

But this was a policy of preservation, trade barriers raised the prices of imported goods, high tariffs were used to subsidize the development of domestic agricultural enterprises, and then the Soviet people would make the right choice with their eyes closed in the face of expensive imported food and cheap domestic production. The only drawback is that the other side may protest in future trade negotiations and restrict the entry of the economic cooperation organization.

"Okay, is there anything else to add?" Yanayev asked unhurriedly as he looked around the quiet surroundings. (To be continued.) )