For the sake of secrecy, the German orders were all dictated without exception. The division commander made a decision that night and gave the necessary orders to the regiment commander verbally on the spot. He then returned to the headquarters and discussed his intentions with the chief of staff of the army. If approved, a telegram was sent to the regiments: "no change", and everything went according to plan.

If there was any important change, the division commander would go to the regiments that night and re-issue the oral order. He commanded the actions of the division from the forward positions on the battlefield. The position of the division commander was with the troops who carried out the main assault, and he had to go to the regiment several times a day. The division headquarters is deployed a little further back, and generally does not change positions during operations. The headquarters is responsible for collecting and sorting out information on the enemy's situation, managing the supply of troops, and mobilizing and reinforcing troops. Communication between the division commander and the command was maintained by radio and only by telephone on a few occasions.

On the Allied side, tank crews, especially those of mechanized corps, were not well trained, and this shortcoming was one of the reasons for the German victory. Of course, the besieged Allied forces still have a strong will to fight, and they can still fight tenaciously in the case of being surrounded.

The battle of the Shaide River, due to the improper methods adopted by the command of the Allied 5th Tank Army, did not make it difficult for the Germans to fight. The various armies they threw into the battle did not coordinate in time when they attacked, nor did the large number of infantry divisions coordinate well with each other. In this way, the German 11th Panzer Division would be able to finish fighting one corps and another, and when this tank army was weakened to a certain extent, the German Panzer Division could even withdraw and deal with another Allied tank army.

The first impressions that the tactics employed by the Allies in the battle of the Sreach River left on the Germans. These impressions were further proved to be true in many subsequent cases.

As a matter of fact. Each German attack was preceded by extensive infiltration activities, with a number of detachments and groups "infiltrating" into defensive positions. No one has yet surpassed Army Group B under the command of Maninstein in mastering this method of warfare.

Although the outer areas were under surveillance, the Germans suddenly appeared in the middle of the German positions, and no one saw them coming, and no one knew when they came. Even in those places where access is particularly difficult, they can appear in groups and quickly dig bunkers.

True, there is nothing difficult for a single soldier to infiltrate. Because the positions of the Allied forces were only defended by weak forces. The interval between the support points is also large. The defensive front of the division was up to 10 miles wide. But it is a striking fact that, despite the fact that the Allies had watched all night, and had watched with wide eyes alertly, the next morning a whole detachment of German troops had come into the infiltrated defensive positions. All weapons and ammunition were brought. And also dug bunkers.

The skill of this infiltration is amazing. There was almost no sound, not a single shot was fired. This infiltration tactic, the Germans used hundreds of times. Significant results have been achieved. The only way to deal with such operations is to strengthen the garrison, to have the alert soldiers on duty to do the depth and constant patrols, and above all, to have sufficient reserves ready at all times to drive away the invading enemy.

Another characteristic of the German operation was the establishment of landing fields wherever and whenever they were in order to serve as a base for subsequent attacks. The German-controlled landing grounds were indeed a great threat.

It would be a mistake to ignore these landing fields, or not to clear them in a timely manner. The landing ground of the German troops, which at first was built may be small and almost harmless, but in a short time they can turn it into a very dangerous position, and soon it will become an insurmountable stronghold.

The landing ground occupied by a German company at night would be expanded to at least one regiment the next morning, and by night it would become a heavily armed stronghold, which could have everything needed to make it almost impregnable.

The Germans had set up a landing ground the first night, and no amount of heavy and concentrated artillery fire could drive it away. The most effective way to do this is to carry out a well-organized offensive. The German principle of "building landing fields everywhere" poses a very serious threat, which cannot be underestimated.

The only reliable here, which must be a principle, is this: if the Germans are building a landing field, or if they are building an advance position, they will attack it, and they will attack it immediately, violently, and hesitation will doom to failure.

An hour of delay can lead to a setback of shock, a delay of two hours is a setback, and a day of delay will call for a great tribulation. Even with only one infantry platoon and only one tank, it is necessary to attack! It is necessary to attack the Allied forces when they are not firmly established, when they are just discovered and easy to deal with, when they have not had time to organize their defenses, and when their heavy weapons have not yet arrived. It's too late to postpone it for a few hours. Sluggishness means failure; Decisive and timely action will be successful.

The tactics of the Germans were a strange mixture. Although they were adept at infiltrating operations and were particularly adept at constructing field fortifications, the rigidity of Allied offensive operations was also almost well known. Stupid repeated assaults on a certain point, formulaic organization of artillery fire, and unskillful selection of terrain for the offensive manifested a lack of creativity and ideological rigidity in the performance of tasks.

The German radio listening team had repeatedly heard such impatient questions: "What are the Germans doing now?" "Only a small number of junior commanders are able to express their personal views when the situation changes. In many cases, what could have been a successful impact, a breakthrough, or a completed encirclement was not extended in time because the superiors did not take care of what to do.

……

At this point, the 550,000 Allied troops in Bobel and the Netherlands were completely separated, with about 300,000 Allied troops in Belgium and about 250,000 Allied troops surrounded in the Netherlands.

The battle to encircle and annihilate this heavy group ensued, and the Germans attacked the Allied forces encircled in Belgium from three different directions, and Patton, of course, was not willing to be captured, but continued to lead the encircled Allied forces to resist desperately, and continued to ask Eisenhower for help.

The invincible General Patton finally tasted the bitter fruit, and Eisenhower also fought with all his strength to press a large number of troops to the Maginot Line, and Eisenhower's tactic was a typical "encirclement of Wei to save Zhao".

Although there were one million German troops on the Maginot Line, they were distributed on the defense line of more than 600 kilometers from the Netherlands in the north to the south of France, and the German troops on the Maginot Line were at most 500,000, and these 500,000 German troops were not elite German field troops, but second-line reserves, and many soldiers were veterans of the First World War over 40 years old. (To be continued......)