(456) No wind and no waves
"The hazards conceived in the study are judged in the order of their seriousness and necessity as follows: 1. Bombing by aircraft; 2. Aircraft launch torpedoes to attack, 3. Destruction of ports; 4. Submarine attacks; 5. Mine attacks, 6. Shelling by warships. With the exception of the first and second hazards mentioned above, all other hazards have been satisfactorily defended against and are therefore mainly discussed in the study to deal with the first and second hazards. In my opinion, both of these attacks could have been carried out by aircraft carriers and the ships that reinforced them behind them. The enemy may use up to twelve squadrons of air for attack, and at least two squadrons. Therefore, as a way to deal with the first two dangers, I propose the following methods:
1. Detect and attack enemy aircraft carriers and their reinforcing ships before an air strike:
2. Detect and shoot down enemy aircraft before they reach the bombing target; 3. Use anti-aircraft artillery fire to repel enemy aircraft; 4. Artificial smoke screens are used to cover up important facilities; 5. Set up balloon blocking nets to protect important facilities.
With regard to strengthening the defense of Pearl Harbor to meet the needs of the situation, I make the following recommendations:
First, the War Department should give the highest priority to increasing the number of fighters and anti-aircraft guns in Hawaii and to establishing an air defense warning system; 2. In order to improve the defense of Pearl Harbor, the War Department should consider the use of balloon blocking nets, smoke screens, and other special devices there; 3. Draw up a plan for coordinated operations on the spot, so that in the event of a surprise attack by enemy aircraft, the Navy and the Army, ships and ground forces will cooperate effectively in air combat and anti-aircraft firepower; 4. Agree that the Army and Navy forces on Oahu shall make appropriate preparations to defend against enemy aircraft attacking Pearl Harbor; 5. As long as the current unstable situation continues, Oahu's army and navy forces must conduct joint preparatory exercises at least once a week to defend against aircraft attacks. ”
"I also think that it is possible for the book to attack without warning, and that the attack may take various forms: either by German or Italian flag ships on the water, or by submarines posing as German or Italian. In addition, the attack may have been directed at ships, far from U.S. territories or naval forces, or it could have been a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or a blockade of its harbor. ”
When the letter was delivered to Stimson, it was inside the U.S. Embassy, a white building in Akasaka, Tokyo. Joseph, known as "Bentong"? Gru, who has been the owner of the building since 1932. At this moment, he was leaning back in an easy chair in the ambassador's office, listening intently to the nervous conversation of the first secretary, Klock. What Croque talked about was told to him by the Peruvian minister to the city, Shuriba, who had close ties to the upper class of society. When Gru heard the report, he was taken aback by its contents, and at the same time could not easily believe it. So he hurriedly called Navy Attache Smith Hatton and asked him what he thought.
"I think it's just street rumors."
"But as the saying goes, there is no wind and no waves!"
"I don't believe it anyway."
"Anyway, let's report to Washington!"
Gru took what he heard as one of the most important pieces of information and drafted a telegram to the dispatcher, and this startling cipher was sent at six o'clock in the afternoon.
"Top Secret Telegram No. 125 Secretary of State:
According to the Peruvian minister to the embassy, he has learned from many people, including himself, that the Peruvian army is planning to use all its military forces to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in the event of an incident with the United States. He also added that this plan seems to have no basis, but because it was heard from many sources, this information was conveyed to you. "This is a seemingly unbelievable plan for Ambassador Gru. That night, while pondering the exceptional telegram he had sent to the State Department, Gru wrote the following passage in his diary: "I hope that our officers and men in Hawaii will not rest easy. ”
Unbeknownst to Gru, he heard this "street rumor" twenty days after Yamamoto wrote to Kazukawa Kaixiang about the historic Hawaiian battle scenario, and Yamamoto's letter to Kazukawa Kaixiang was extremely secret. Outside the text, he wrote in a red pen: "It is for His Excellency the Minister to read alone, and please burn it immediately after reading." Therefore, it is indeed difficult to imagine where this secret was leaked out of the world, making it a "street rumor".
If it's not "the walls have ears", then what's going on?
In fact, the reason for this happened was that the newspaper reported in detail on the Taranto incident, and this incident also caused a great shock to the Navy. Therefore, among the "street strategists" who cared about the navy, there was an idea: "What the British Navy can do, this Navy can also do." "It's inconceivable. They exaggerated it so much that it became the statement that "our army will attack Pearl Harbor at the beginning of the war."
The U.S. Department of State sent a copy of Ambassador Gru's message to the U.S. War Department and the U.S. Department of the Navy, requesting that the Directorate of Naval Intelligence decipher the contents of the telegram and provide comments. The experts' opinion was that what the Peruvian Minister said was purely "fictitious". However, Chief of Naval Operations Stark advocated that the telegram should be taken to Pearl Harbor for reference anyway, and ordered that the message be attached to the end of the telegram with the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel McCallum, chief of the Far East Section of the Marine Intelligence Bureau. This telegram was photographed on 1 February and was in the hands of the commander of the Pacific Fleet: "The summary of the telegram sent by the US ambassador to the Pacific to the State Department on 27 January is hereby notified below for reference. …… The US Naval Intelligence Agency does not consider such rumors credible. Judging by the information available to us about the present disposition and operations of the Army and Navy forces, we do not believe that the operation against Pearl Harbor is imminent, nor does it appear that such a plan exists in the foreseeable future. ”
At this time, on the calm waters of Pearl Harbor, which is always summer, the new and former commanders of the US Pacific Fleet are solemnly holding a handover ceremony on the aft deck of the flagship "Pennsylvania" under the long barrel of the 406-mm caliber triple main gun. Commander Richardson stepped down, and he was replaced by Hirschbend? Commander Kimmel will shoulder the heavy responsibility of commanding a huge fleet in the rough Pacific Ocean to defend the security of the motherland.
Originally, Richardson's strategic judgment was: from the current state of the world, ensuring the Western Hemisphere is indispensable for the security of the United States; To be involved in the Pacific War was a major mistake. Even from a purely naval strategic point of view, the stationing of the fleet in Hawaii has a number of disadvantages. Richardson believed that the Pacific Fleet was not only at a disadvantage compared with the Pacific Fleet, but was also not fully prepared in terms of combat readiness, either in terms of manpower or material resources. He expressed doubts that the strength of such a fleet alone would have the effect of stopping the action of the Zomoto.
Based on the above views, Richardson has always advocated the return of the Pacific Fleet to the West Coast of the United States, which is convenient for reorganization, replenishment, and training. And this proposition is one of the biggest reasons why he stepped down from the post of commander of the Pacific Fleet.
For Commander Kimmel, the handover ceremony was one of the proudest moments of his life, his eyes shining brightly and his entire facial expression revealing hope for the future.
However, in the days following his appointment, Kimmel inspected the situation at the Pacific Fleet and the Pearl Harbor base, and found that the situation was not encouraging.
Not so long ago, Secretary of the War Stimson wrote a reply letter to Secretary of the Navy Knox in response to his question about the enemy's surprise attack on the fleet and naval base at Pearl Harbor. Stimson begins his letter by writing: "In view of the gravity of the problem, and in order to deal with this hostile act, I fully agree that we should be at once prepared to the fullest extent possible." He went on to assure that "the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority." But was the defense of Pearl Harbor really given "the highest priority" and realized, as Stimson had assured?
Secretary of the Navy Knox emphasized strengthening the defense of Pearl Harbor, and Secretary of War Stimson "fully agreed" with Knox's opinion that Pearl Harbor should be supplemented with at least the minimum necessary if not all the requirements of the local commanders. However, contrary to what was stated in the letters between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army, Pearl Harbor's defense capability was still extremely weak.
The Hawaiian Army was originally planned to have 180 B17 aircraft, but only 12 were actually available, of which only six could be used for patrol duty. The local commander asked for 300 seaplanes, but in reality only 50 were equipped, and the remaining 250 were due to President Roosevelt's adviser Harry? Hopkins' political influence, which was transferred to the British. In this way, if you want to patrol a 360-degree circle every day, the patrol capacity of the Pearl Harbor base is only limited to two or three days!
In addition, although the six mobile radars scheduled for Pearl Harbor had already arrived, they were not skilled in using them because of the short time they were used, and at the same time, they did not believe in the role of radars. As a result, the radar is rendered useless. Of the six fixed radars scheduled for Pearl Harbor, only three were shipped and are still being installed and cannot be used.
On the same day that Stimson replied to Knox, the senior adjutant of the U.S. Department of the Army sent a copy of the Secretary of the Admiralty's letter to the Secretary of the Army and a copy of the Secretary of the Army's reply to the Hawaiian Army, informing him that "we should cooperate with the local naval authorities to make the means of mutual defense effective." On the naval side, Stark, the chief of operations, forwarded copies of the letters exchanged between the two ministers to Commander Kimmel of the Pacific Fleet and Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii) Bullock.
Commander of the 14th Naval Military Region, Bullock, and Army Commander Short of the Hawaiian side, in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Hawaiian Army and Navy aircraft and improve the effectiveness of defending against enemy aircraft, established a joint committee on air combat, communications, air defense, chemical warfare, and weapons at an early stage. The exchange of letters between the two Secretaries of the Army and Navy led to agreements and plans between the Hawaiian Army and Navy forces to defend the area centered on Pearl Harbor and to secure the fleet.
On the very day that Stark delivered copies of the letters exchanged between the two ministers to Kimmel on February 11 (formerly known as Anno Day), Chief of Naval Operations Stark sent a confidential document dated February 17 to the commanders of the naval districts, ordering them:
"It is necessary to investigate and study the issue of using anti-torpedo devices to protect the harbors in the area under their jurisdiction, especially to protect large ships anchored in the main bases of the fleet, and to give opinions."
In the document, Stark said: "Just because a ship is anchored in waters at a depth of 10 fathoms (18.3 meters) does not mean that it is too safe to be attacked by torpedo bombers." He added to the document: "Most of the torpedoes fired by British aircraft carriers in the Battle of Taranto were between 13 fats (23.8 m) and 15 fats (27.5 m), with only a few torpedoes between 11 fats (20 m) and even 12 fats (21.8 m). "The commander of the Hawaiian Army, Vice Admiral Short, informed his fellow units that, in order to maximize the preparation of aircraft in the Hawaiian area, they recommended that they draw up detailed plans for the following aspects in accordance with the "Joint Defense Plan for the Seas off the Hawaii Coast" jointly drawn up by the Hawaiian Army forces and the 14th Naval District on April 14, 1939:
joint air exercises; Communication; common use of airports, identification of aircraft; vigilance and duty; the provision of equipment such as various ammunition for aircraft; alerting and detecting enemy aircraft; Use balloons to block nets and smoke screens:
the addition of fighter jets and anti-aircraft guns, as well as the equipping of anti-aircraft alerts; Army and Navy aircraft take combat action against air strikes by enemy aircraft, effectively adjusting ships and ground air defense weapons; Army and Navy forces conduct joint exercises at least once a week aimed at defending against air attacks by enemy aircraft.
Kimmel then wrote in a detailed report to Chief of Naval Operations Stark on the current state of the Pacific Fleet: "I think that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (with submarines or planes, or both) is possible. In order to minimize the damage caused by such a surprise attack and to inflict heavy damage on the invading enemy, I am taking swift and practical measures. ”
The local commanders in Hawaii were less concerned than Washington with anti-torpedo netting to protect ships anchored in Pearl Harbor from torpedoes. In a letter to Secretary Stark, Commander Kimmel said: "I recommend that you do not supply Pearl Harbor with anti-torpedo nets until such equipment is developed that is simple and effective, and that it can be adapted to the needs of an emergency and set up quickly." "In addition, Commander of the 14th Naval District (Hawaii), Bullock, in his report to Secretary Stark, also recommended that anti-torpedo nets should not be installed on the following grounds: (1) the water depth at the Pearl Harbor mooring should not exceed 45 feet (13.7 m); 3. Most of the anchorage area is close to the main channel, where submarine cables and pipelines are laid; Fourth, the relevant devices to protect the fleet's berths will seriously affect the passage of ships on the shipping lanes.
A week later, Stark wrote to Kimmel asking him to "not neglect the study of air strikes on the fire-prone city of Timber, ostensibly against military targets," as he drew up his Pacific Fleet battle plan. At the same time, he explained the reason: "Such an attack will affect the morale of the people of the country, and may be able to restrain the military action of the army." Stark then added, "It may be considered inappropriate to take such a risk, but in any case (and it is strictly confidential), you and I may be ordered to do so." So, I hope you think about your plans in this regard. ”
Needless to say, this was "ordered" by the President of the United States, the commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy.
Stark said this in his letter, probably in consideration of President Roosevelt's reference to the U.S. Global Strategic Approach: "The Navy should consider the possibility of bombing the city." ”
Although the Americans are also preparing intensively, they do not know that they are far from their opponents.
As the international situation became tense, some of the ships of the Navy that had been reorganized were immediately incorporated into the Combined Fleet, and although it was peacetime, the Combined Fleet was close to wartime strength. It is said that the Combined Fleet is conducting actual combat training and basic exercises while assembling in Tokyo Bay.
At this time, Minoru Minakasa, a staff officer of the 1st Air Force, had already come up with the specific plan for the surprise attack in the officer's dormitory of the "Pancheng" aircraft carrier.
Ever since Rear Admiral Takakijiro Onishi, Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Force, had secretly commissioned him to conduct a preliminary study of Commander Yamamoto's plan for an attack on Hawaii, he had been using the time spent by the officers and men of the USS Panjo to bury their heads in the study. After thinking about it, he finally came up with a plan easily.
Genda's plan was: In order to achieve a complete victory in the offensive, it was necessary to carry out bombing in turns, not one bombing. At that time, because the hit rate of horizontal bombing was not high, and the technical problem of "shallow water torpedoes" (Pearl Harbor was 12 meters deep) could not be solved immediately, carrier-based bombers carried out dive bombing, with aircraft carriers as the first target and capital ships as the second target. The ships that were put into battle were the "Pancheng" and "Tianlong" aircraft carriers (the First Air Force), the "Soryu" and "Flying Dragon" (the Second Air Force), and the "Zuihe" and "Xianghe" (the Third Air Force), which were large ships and air carriers owned by the Institute at that time. The departure base is tentatively Chichijima (Ogasawara Islands) or Akkeshi (Hokkaido). The attack fleet waited for the aircraft carriers to approach Hawaii for 200 nautical miles before taking off.
(To be continued)