Flender then returned to the east bank of the river and again came to the crossing point of the 7th Infantry Panzer Division, which by this time was in full swing. Here, 5 anti-tank guns had already crossed the river, sappers were erecting 8-ton pontoons, and Bismarck ordered the 16-ton ones to be replaced. Flender, of course, asked Bismarck to borrow an anti-tank gun.

The sappers fought desperately, and the commander of the engineer battalion and many soldiers were killed. Flender was overly optimistic at noon and ready to move on before consolidating the bridgehead. However, due to the shelling of the French army, it was not until the evening that the first batch of tanks began to cross the river. At this time, it seemed that the French army was about to launch a counteroffensive against the bridgehead again. The situation was dangerous for a while, but Flender went to the west bank again, and after learning about the situation, he returned to the east bank and ordered the tanks to continue crossing the river at night to support the west bank

So, what did the French army on the other side of Flender do? Judging by Flender's account, the resistance of the infantry of the 1st line of the French army was stubborn, and until the evening of the 13th, small French forces held out on the west bank (behind the 7th river crossing force). However, the performance of the French army's support units and chain of command was problematic. From now on, we will continue to see that the French side will miss one opportunity after another until it falls into the abyss because of the loose discipline and lack of enterprising spirit of the French army, the weakening of communications and the outdated thinking of the command staff.

In fact, on the 13th, the main forces of the Luftwaffe were supporting Limer, and there was very little support for Flender. Therefore, the reason for France's defeat in this region can only be found in itself. The first problem of the French army was that the speed of the seventh was too fast, and the 18th Infantry Division (66th, 77th and 125th regiments), which was responsible for defending the river bank, was not all in place.

The 66th regiment in the face of Flender was particularly thin. Secondly. Due to the weakened communication system, the French army was slow to react. At 1 a.m., the commander of the 5th French Motorized Division learned of the 7th crossing from the 1st Battalion defending Hauckes, and five hours later he was unable to communicate with that battalion, despite the fact that his headquarters was only 10 miles from the front line. In desperation, he sent a team of motorcycles and several lightly armored vehicles to reconnoiter the riverbank.

At 10 a.m., the French 5th Motorized Division decided to use its 129th Regiment to cross the Haucks at 1 p.m., but the regiment did not begin its operations until 2 p.m. Almost immediately it was delayed by the threat of enemy aircraft. The task of counterattack was then taken over by an elite motorized dragoon regiment of the 2nd Infantry Corps.

But this regiment reported that they = could not be ready until 8 p.m. So the attack was postponed until the morning of the second day. ----- all this was the best effort of the best units of the French 9th Army.

For the French 18th Division, the connection between its 3 regiments was almost broken. The commander of the French 11th Army, General Martin, had to come down at noon to the headquarters of the 18th Division, where General Martin met the commander of the 39th Regiment, and he actually reported to General Martin that he had encountered German scouts eight miles from the Metz River.

General Martin then ordered the 39th Regiment to counterattack towards the river. "Throw the Germans into the river". The counterattack will be supported by a company of tanks and 3 artillery battalions. The attack was launched at half past seven in the evening. Meanwhile. The 66th Regiment reported that it was exhausted and that the 125th Regiment could not be contacted. All this was only the result of several infantry companies of Flender. They don't have any heavy weapons to support them yet.

By half past six in the evening, the 39th regiment reported that the regiment could not arrive on time, and the counterattack was postponed until 8 o'clock. However, by 7:45, the regiment again reported that it was unable to advance. So the tank company had to attack alone. The French tanks thought it was easy to sweep the Germans in front of them, but without infantry support, the tanks were vegetables in front of the iron fist, so the French retreated after only half the battle.

That's all the French team has done for the seventh bridgehead. If it weren't for Flender's personal presence at the front, if the French army had a little more aggressiveness, history might have been rewritten, at least, if the 7th bridgehead could have been eliminated, although the 7th would have been bound to intensify again subsequently, it would undoubtedly have bought time for France. At this time, the seventh bridgehead had only a small area, there were no heavy weapons and anti-tank guns. A company of tanks can already sweep everything.

All night, the 7th Tankers waited anxiously for the sappers to build the bridge. At this time, news of the Seventh Strength Meth River began to slowly reach the headquarters of Ganmalin. First in the Haucks area, followed by the counteroffensive of the French 9th Army, there was no news for a long time. It wasn't until 4 p.m. that snowflakes of news about Sedang (Limer) came from the 2nd Army. The French chain of command apparently did not realize the seriousness of the problem. General George briefly told Ganmalin that the front in the Setang area was under slight pressure!!

At 7:15 a.m. on the 13th, Li Mo issued the final order for crossing the river. At 3 p.m., the German 6th Panzer Division was to cross the river from the Bar River to Bazeye on the Sedanzo. The 5th Panzer Division, if it can be reached, will cross the river at Dangchali as the right flank; The 7th Panzer Division was in the center, at Torsidu, slightly north of Sedan.

The main attack was carried out by the 7th Panzer Division, which, after crossing the river, was to quickly take control of the road from Torsy to Bellevue and the surrounding heights, and uproot the French positions in the Sedan area. Limer reinforced the 7th Panzer Division with the "Greater Germany" infantry regiment, and at the same time transferred heavy artillery battalions (150mm) and an assault engineer battalion from the 5th and 6th Panzer Divisions. All fire is to be concentrated on a 2-mile stretch of breach.

The crossing was carried out by 3 battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Balk and 4 battalions of the "Greater Germany" Infantry Regiment. To encourage his troops, Limer told the 7th Panzer Division's firepower and the Luftwaffe that they would cover them with all their might, and behind them, the 14th Motorized Corps was ready to expand the gains.

In the early morning, under the cover of the morning mist, groups of upright, healthy and confident German soldiers with their sleeves rolled up approached the riverbank. Vehicles of all kinds finally got out of the traffic jam and parked near any suitable place for cover on the riverbank.

The buzz of German planes was heard in the sky, and at this time, the French began shelling. Soon the 6th Panzer Division reported that enemy fire made any movement impossible, and to cross the river, the Air Force had to destroy the enemy artillery group. The artillery, infantry and river-crossing sappers of the 7th Panzer Division, with their equipment, hid as close to the river bank as possible and prepared for the storm. The opposite bank was much higher than this, and they were clearly aware that if this shelling continued, there would be serious losses in personnel and equipment.

The French army on the opposite bank also clearly saw the 7th Panzer Division, more than 50 tanks, countless vehicles, personnel and equipment, excellent targets. However, at this very moment, the French artillery received orders from the commander of the 10th Army to limit the consumption of ammunition to 30 rounds per gun. The main reason for the French restrictions on ammunition was not the lack of shells, (in a few days, a large number of shells would fall into the hands of the 7th Panzer Army).

The reason for the limitation of ammunition by the commander of the 10th French Army, Grandesard, was that, according to the experience of 1914-1918, it was impossible for the 7th Panzer Army to cross the river in 6 days. Therefore, he did not want to waste too many shells until the decisive stage came. Although he had witnessed the build-up and preparation of the 7th on the other side, the commander of the 55th Division, which was about to be attacked directly, held the same view.

…… (To be continued.) )u