In the Yibin Garrison Command, Huang Haoran welcomed two uninvited guests: Soviet Ambassador to China Bogomolov and then the military chief adviser of the Wuhan government, Cherepanov. Pen, fun, and www.biquge.info

When Huang Haoran was the director of the receiving materials office, he had a lot of words with Bogomolov. It was precisely because of the good personal relationship he established with the Soviet ambassador that the 25th Army took advantage of the distribution of Soviet-aided weapons.

By the end of 1938, the first and second batches of military supplies purchased by the Wuhan government on loans from the Soviet Union had all been shipped into China, and the third batch had also begun to be shipped. It is expected that after all the reception is completed, 30-40 Chinese divisions can be armed.

As a result of Huang Haoran's adoption of Huang Haoran's policy of "taking more quickly" and repairing the border road in Xinjiang ahead of schedule, the Wuhan government has received a relatively large increase in both the quantity and type of Soviet aid materials compared with history.

According to Huang Haoran's character, how can there be a reason to guard Baoshan and not enter it? Excluding such equipment as airplanes, which were not suitable for untouchable equipment, whether it was combat vehicles, artillery of various calibers, or communications equipment, the 25th Army had obtained a considerable amount.

More in the area of light weapons. Countless pistols, ammunition, and grenades were moved, and at least half of the 9,700 light and heavy machine guns Huang Haoran had taken away. And the 30,000 Moxing Nagant rifles did not leak out, and all of them were in the bag.

At first, other generals made small reports to the highest authorities and the Military Commission, but none of them responded. After realizing that the highest authorities made it clear that they wanted to defend Huang Haoran, these guys began to desperately run to Huang Haoran's headquarters, hoping to get a piece of the Soviets' aid by patting them on the back.

There is only so much rice in the pot, and if others eat more, they will have to eat less.

In order to give full play to the role of these Soviet-aided weapons on the battlefield of resistance against Japan, Huang Haoran held high the warrant of the highest authorities to "give priority to the supply of meritorious troops" and continued to brazenly "engage in corruption." Coupled with the willingness of the Soviet Union to cooperate, this directly led to the fact that the receiving office was called the "Far Eastern Logistics Department of the 25th Group Army" behind the scenes.

Compared with the familiarity with Bogomolov, Huang Haoran has hardly dealt with Cherepanov.

In order to cause more trouble to the Japanese, the Soviet Union gave the Wuhan government large-scale assistance in terms of morality, public opinion, material, and military.

After the outbreak of the Battle of Wuhan, the Soviet Union's Pravda, Izvestia, and Moscow Evening News published a large number of articles condemning the aggression, sympathizing with and eulogizing China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and expressing moral and public opinion support for the Battle of Wuhan.

With the arrival of Soviet arms and weapons in China, especially the suspension of Sino-German military relations in 1938, all German advisers who had stayed in China were recalled, and at the invitation of the Wuhan government, a group of Soviet military advisers immediately came to China. Until August 1938, Dragivin was appointed as the general adviser of the Chinese military. In August, the Soviet Union sent General Galen's deputy, Cherepanov, to China to take over as general military adviser. In the second half of the same year, Soviet advisers began to come to China one after another, and advisory institutions were established. These organizations not only have a complete range of categories, including military advisers to the army and air force, as well as advisers to engineers, artillery, tanks, and other arms, but also have a large number of people and a huge contingent. Among them, the third, fifth, and ninth theaters involved in the Battle of Wuhan were respectively served by Bobrov, Bogolyubov, Alferov, and Alia Bushv as senior advisers to the theater. According to the statistics of the Military Commission, by mid-December 1938, the number of Soviet military experts assisting China reached 3,665.

The choice of Cherepanov to go to China was also well thought out by the Soviets. He had a relationship with China for a while, and he was an old acquaintance.

During the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy, in order to support the Chinese revolution, the Soviets enthusiastically introduced the best military talents in China to Whampoa.

Cherepanov, then a brave and skilled officer in the Soviet Red Army, arrived in Beijing in 1923 and then in Guangzhou, where he was soon received by Sun Yat-sen.

In accordance with Sun Yat-sen's instructions, Cherepanov unreservedly imparted the experience and knowledge he had gained from the Soviet Civil War and the Academy of the General Staff to the teachers and students of Whampoa.

Although later the supreme authorities changed Sun Yat-sen's joint strategy, this was not in the hands of Cherepanov. Among the early Whampoa students, he was still quite prestigious. Stalin sent him to China because of this resource.

It's a pity that it backfired. When Soviet military advisers arrived in China, they were not heavily used by the highest authorities. In the eyes of the Chinese leader of the war of resistance, the Red Soviet Union was dangerous. Obtaining supplies from the north is just an imaginable expedient measure for no other way.

Things can be accepted, but the Soviets must not dictate to China!

When Soviet military advisers arrived in China, they were mainly engaged in two areas.

The first is to train the Chinese army. Because the Chinese army was originally poorly armed and equipped with low quality soldiers, and a large number of Soviet weapons arrived in China, the primary task of the Soviet advisers was to provide universal training to the Chinese army. For example, they established a training base in Xiangtan, and from March to October 1938, they used Soviet-aided tanks to train tankers, and on this basis, formed China's first mechanized division.

Second, it is necessary to draw up and implement operational plans for major campaigns. In view of the situation between China and Japan at the beginning of the Battle of Wuhan, at the end of July 1938, Dragevin proposed to the highest authorities a plan to implement an offensive and defensive plan in the 3rd, 5th, and 9th theaters, suggesting the formation of well-armed assault groups with reinforced artillery to crush the Japanese attacking Wuhan. After taking office, Cherepanov put forward a more active, concrete, and practical defensive operation plan, which hit the nail on the head of the shortcomings of the strategic defense phase of the Wuhan government army. However, this plan was not adopted by the Wuhan government army high command.

In the early days of the war, the role of Soviet military advisers was relatively limited. This is because the highest authorities do not want them to be genuinely involved in major military decisions, but rather to use them as technical advisers.

Take the Wuhan battlefield where fierce battles are currently raging. If Cherepanov, the general military adviser, was really entrusted with a heavy task, then how could he leave his post and run to Yibin at the critical moment when the Japanese soldiers surrounded the fortress of Tianjiazhen?

In fact, not only Cherepanov, but also senior advisers in the third, fifth, and ninth theaters of operations, as well as Bogolyubov, Alferov, and Alia Bushv. They led Soviet military experts to do only some technical work such as map work and sand table making all day long, and as for specific military advice, it was never adopted.

The wariness of the highest authorities towards the Soviets can be seen from this.

If the Soviets had tried to solve their predicament through Huang Haoran, today's meeting would have been doomed to an unhappy end.

In that case, the 25th Army will have no share of the third batch of supplies...... (To be continued.) )