The signs of war could not be clearer, and the global news media are speculating that war is imminent. [No pop-up novel network]

The major news media hired well-known figures to comment on the imminent outbreak of the "South Asian War," and most commentators believed that the war would break out around the 15th. Pakistan first declared war on India, and the Republic then declared war on India under the Treaty of Alliance. Within 24 hours, the two countries will crush the Indian Air Force, which has not yet recovered, and seize air supremacy on the battlefield. Pakistan will fight mainly in the western theater and strive to capture Indian-administered Kashmir as soon as possible; In addition to providing Pakistan with the necessary provisions, the Republic will concentrate its main forces on the eastern battlefield and strive to recover southern Tibet and complete ground combat operations within 115 days.

For India, if it wants to avoid war, it must act by the 15th.

Among the many news reviews, the report received the most attention, because everyone knows that it has a close relationship with the CIA, and most of its reports are related to the CIA.

According to the report, the war will not break out before the 20th.

In order to prove this point, John Pukins, a retired Air Force major general who participated in the construction of the "national missile defense system," was specially invited to give a comprehensive briefing on the combat methods and combat effectiveness of the "air-based laser interception system" and "ground-based missile interception system" provided to Pakistan by the Republic.

Both the "air-based laser interception system" and the "ground-to-surface missile interception system" belong to the "missile defense system," and the key strength of the "missile defense system" is not the interception capability, but the detection capability. Although the flight trajectory of ballistic missiles is relatively fixed, and even ballistic missiles with the ability to change orbits and maneuver are detectable, the flight trajectory of ballistic missiles is relatively high, and the flight speed is relatively fast: it is enough to hit the target within a few minutes to more than ten minutes, and whether or not an incoming ballistic missile can be detected in a timely and accurate manner determines the interception result.

Detection capability is the bottleneck of the "missile interception system".

Being able to destroy a ballistic missile before it is fired is, of course, the most ideal form of defense. Because most of the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are launched in a mobile manner, even if the attacking side has absolute air supremacy, it is difficult to destroy all of the enemy's ballistic missiles.

If you can't destroy a missile on the ground, you can only intercept it after it's fired.

In this case, the ground method is that the ballistic missile has not left the atmosphere after it has been launched. It was also destroyed in the "booster phase". Because India's surface-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles have a range of more than 1,500 kilometers. Can be deployed far from the front line behind the ground. However, the maximum range of the Republic's ground-based "air-based laser interception system" and "ground-based missile interception system" is only 500 kilometers and 250 kilometers, even if the Republic and Pakistan can seize air supremacy within 24 hours. Nor will it prevent India from firing nuclear-tipped surface-based missiles within 24 hours. Therefore, it is very difficult for the "missile interception system" provided by the Republic to Pakistan to pose a threat to Indian missiles that are in the "boost-up stage".

After the ballistic missile leaves the atmosphere. Enter the "Middle Section".

Although it is not impossible to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. Both the Republic's "National Strategic Defense System" and the US "National Missile Defense System" can intercept space targets, including missiles and satellites, at altitudes below 500 km. However, the Republic did not provide Pakistan with an "outer space interception capability" ground defense system to the Indian "Agni". type with "Agni" |||The "mid-course ballistics" of medium-range ballistic missiles are all above 25C kilometers. It will not be possible to intercept Indian SSBMs at this stage.

Up to this point, interception can only be carried out when the ballistic missile enters the stage of "re-entry ballistics".

The ground interception test was carried out from the 9th to the 11th. All are aimed at "re-entry ballistics" to demonstrate the limited capabilities of the "missile interception system" that the Republic has provided to Pakistan.

At this stage. Interception time is measured in seconds!

Because of the use of "missile body separation technology", the re-entry velocity of India's 2 medium-range ballistic missiles is above Mach 20. From the maximum altitude of 150 km to the ground, up to 3C! In these 30 years, it is difficult not only to find and track the missile warhead, but also to intercept it.

According to data provided by Hopkins, six "air-based laser interception systems" and three "ground-based missile interception systems" can only provide Pakistan with the most basic "strategic security guarantees."

Under ideal circumstances, that is, the target trajectory has been mastered and the target data is determined at the first time, the "air-based laser interception system" needs to continuously irradiate the target1 to ensure destruction; Before intercepting the second target, the "air-based laser interception system" requires about 5 cooling and retargeting times. That is, within 30, 1 "air-based laser interception system" can intercept a maximum of 2 targets.

The combat mode of the "ground-based missile interception system" is different from that of the "air-based laser interception system", in the general combat mode, when the target enters the atmosphere, the "ground-based missile interception system" will simultaneously fire two interceptor missiles at the target to carry out the first attack

Cut. Then the interception system automatically screens the interception situation, if the interception system has been destroyed and automatically searches for the second batch of targets, if the targets are not destroyed, the interception system will fire the second batch of missiles and carry out a second round of interception of the targets. Because each "ground-based missile interception system" has 6 fire control channels, it is possible to intercept 6 targets at the same time. With an 80% probability of destruction, it is possible to intercept 9 to 1C targets at a time.

In this way, the "missile interception system" provided by the Republic to Pakistan can only intercept one missile at most.

Objectively speaking, the interception capability is not bad. The US "National Missile Defense System" can intercept up to 150 targets at the same time.

The key is how to detect and present the target.

According to information provided by Hopkins, the "long-range warning radar" deployed by the Republic in Quetta, Pakistan, is a genuine "strategic missile surveillance, detection, and early warning radar," which uses the ultra-long-wave frequency band and has a maximum effective detection range of more than one meter, which can accurately locate the ballistic missile launch situation within 3,000 kilometers and calculate the missile's flight trajectory within 30 days after the ballistic missile is launched, thus providing at least five minutes of early warning time for interception work.

In order for the "air-based laser interception" and "ground-based missile interception systems" to play a role, they must rely on the target parameters provided by the "strategic missile surveillance, detection, and early warning radar." To this end, the Republic of China has set up five "missile warning centers" in the northeast, northwest, southwest, Hainan, and southeastern regions.

Although the previously fixed-deployment "Strategic Missile Surveillance, Detection, and Early Warning Radar" has the ability to be deployed in a mobile manner with the help of miniaturization of electronic equipment, the radar antenna is very large due to the limitations of the radar work system, and even if it can be transported by air, it will take a lot of time to assemble and debug.

According to Hopkin's guess, the data for the missile interception test conducted on the 9th and 11th was provided by the Republic's radars deployed in the northwest and southwest, not by the radars deployed in Quetta. Even if the republic's engineers were responsible for the assembly and commissioning of the radar, it would take 0 days for the radar to work properly.

As a result, Pakistan will have a missile defense capability in the true sense of the word by the 20th.

If the Republic wants to instigate a war in Pakistan, it must provide Pakistan with adequate strategic security.

Judging by the logistical preparations of the Republic and Pakistan, the war will not break out before the 20th.

Although the Republic has the world's second only strategic airlift capability to the United States, and its huge fleet of transport aircraft can transport tens of thousands of tons of combat materials to the front line every day, under the circumstance of limited purpose, the Republic will not invest too many ground combat troops in order to seize air supremacy, and the Republic Air Force must fully dispatch air bases, air defense positions, strategic command centers, communications centers, and other high-value strategic targets throughout India to bomb, and the consumption of materials within two days after the outbreak of war will not be less than 500,000 tons for ground combat operations. As well as possible contingencies, the republic must send from 1 to 1.5 million tons of war materiel to the front before the war breaks out.

The entire material delivery will last more than 1 week, and it will be completed around the 17th.

It also takes time to assemble and mobilize troops. In the stage of material and equipment, transport aircraft undertake a large number of tasks, while the ground forces invested by the Republic are mainly airborne troops and air assault troops, which require sufficient airlift capacity. In this way, it is impossible for the republic to start a war at the stage of logistical preparation.

Combining these factors, Hopkins concluded that the war could only break out on the 20th at the earliest.

Almost no one cherishes Hopkins' analysis, because he represents the CIA and the Pentagon.

In the face of the "provocations" of the Republic and Pakistan, India is actively engaged in diplomatic activities while preparing for war.

On the afternoon of the 11th, Rurajapani issued the highest combat readiness order, and more than 1.7 million Indian soldiers entered a state of war.

On the same day, India's representative to the United Nations strongly condemned the military provocations of the Republic and Pakistan at the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, and expressed the hope that the Security Council would make positive contributions to maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. The proposal by the representative of India was not adopted in the Council because of the opposition of the Republic.

On the 12th, Rurajapani ordered the troops deployed at the Bernihar Pass to voluntarily retreat a kilometer.

The artillery battle, which lasted for one day, ended abruptly, but the Pakistani army did not stop there. On the night of the 12th, Pakistani ground forces crossed the de facto ceasefire line between the two sides and occupied positions south of the pass, which had been controlled by Indian troops.

On the 13th, Rurajapani summoned the ambassador of the Republic to India, hoping to hold the fifth round of negotiations on the "border issue in southern Tibet" as soon as possible, and hinted that India could make appropriate concessions on some major issues.

India's peace signal did not reciprocate, and in a diplomatic note in reply to India, the Republic's Foreign Minister Yan Shanglong made it clear that the Republic would not have much hope for negotiations unless India took the initiative to withdraw its troops deployed in southern Tibet and recognize the "traditional line" as the actual border between the two sides.

At this point, war is not far off. (To be continued, if you want to know what will happen next.) More chapters,! )