The reinforcement speed of the dispatched army is very fast, but relying on the strength of the dispatched army itself that has been stretched to the extreme, it does not have the ability to completely rescue the Hebei battlefield. Compared with the dispatch army, the attitude of the base camp is very subtle. Although it has always been reinforcing the Chinese battlefield, the speed and intensity of the reinforcements seem to be too slow.

Each time it is the reinforcement of two divisions and two divisions, how can such a small number of troops be enough in the face of the ever-changing war situation? How can such milked reinforcements meet such a huge need in the Hebei battlefield? The enemy army came not only with a few divisions, but also with a few poorly equipped corps. Rather, it is an overwhelming array of tanks and heavy artillery, bombers, and hundreds of thousands of well-armed troops.

In such a situation, every time you squeeze toothpaste, you are still transferred to two divisions and regiments dominated by infantry, what role can it play. Isn't this sending meat into the tiger's mouth? Sometimes Uchiyama Eitaro really can't figure out whether the base camp really doesn't take the Hebei battlefield as a thing, or does it really not look up to the opponent?

Uchiyama Eitaro thinks that the base camp made several mistakes, the first of which is that he was too greedy. No matter how important the Shanxi battlefield is, but it is lost in northern Shanxi, the entire Shanxi battlefield has been opened. The entire Shanxi battlefield was already under attack on all sides, and the superiority of the First Army was gone.

At present, the troops of the 18th Group Army, which already have an absolute superiority in terms of strength and control area in the Shanxi battlefield, have been reborn with the support of the Northeast Communist Army, and their equipment and tactics have been greatly improved. This is no longer the same as it used to be, and it is no longer the armed force that is not only strong-willed, but the whole is short of guns and ammunition.

In this situation, it still cites the Shanxi battlefield. In order to maintain the offensive posture against Shaanxi, he made himself want to save face and suffer the crime. A large number of troops were pinned down to the Shanxi battlefield, not only could they not get out and were unable to give any support to the Hebei battlefield, but they were also in a difficult situation.

If the Hebei battlefield was the beginning, it should not be said that the Pingjin battlefield had just started. The main force of the First Army immediately got rid of the harassment and containment of the surrounding North China Communist Army and concentrated its forces eastward out of the Taihang Mountains, and the situation would not have deteriorated so quickly. At least the Pingjin front, which can get reinforcements at the first time, will not be lost so quickly. And the Pingjin line was lost, and the gateway of the entire Hebei was opened.

Shanxi's strategic position is indeed important. But once Hebei and Pingjin are lost, the First Army will become a lone army, and no matter how important the strategic location is, what is the use? At that time, not only will they not be able to play the role that the base camp expects them to play in the strategic pattern of the entire Chinese battlefield, but the base camp will also have a headache for the rescue of the First Army.

If last year's battle ended, the base camp would decisively abandon the Shanxi battlefield and hand over Shanxi to the second theater of operations on the Chongqing side. Taking advantage of the internal contradictions of the Chinese will certainly have a much better effect. The base camp was not abandoned when it should have been abandoned, resulting in a support army closest to the Hebei battlefield, and now it can only sit in a lonely city. I agreed now, but it was too late.

The second point is that the enemy's southward movement is not judged enough, and it is always believed that Manchuria is still under the attack of the Kwantung Army and the Korean Army on both sides, and the enemy army will not dare to draw too many troops into the south of the Guanguan to fight. As a result, the whole judgment was wrong, resulting in the insufficient number of troops invested by the North China Front at the beginning.

As a result, at the beginning of the battle, the entire North China Front was always in a passive position, which led to the loss of Beiping and gave the entire transportation hub of North China to the enemy. The North China Front fought too aggrieved in this battle, and if there were three or five more divisions and regiments on the Beiping battlefield at the beginning, the Beiping battlefield would definitely not have been lost so quickly.

The third point is the tactical use of the enemy's southward movement, which still makes a whole misjudgment. It is believed that the terrain around Beiping, and even the terrain of the entire Pingjin surrounding area, is not conducive to the enemy's large-scale concentrated tank cluster. There was a serious error in judging the number of tanks that the enemy might put into the vicinity of the Pingjin battlefield.

Although during the Jinsui operation last year, there were already cases of enemy tank clusters crossing the entire Yinshan and suddenly inserting into the Suinan battlefield. Even as an opponent, for the hand taken by the Anti-Alliance, Uchiyama Eitaro has to say that it is wonderful. However, this year, the base camp and even the headquarters of the North China Front did not pay much attention to the enemy's tank and mountain warfare.

I just found a few staff officers of the Mengjiang garrison in those years, went to Pingxi and Pingbei to look at it, and made a certain comparison between the mountainous areas around Beiping and the entire Yinshan Mountain back then. It is believed that, except for a few roads, the rest of the area is not capable of fighting a penetrating battle with tanks.

Because last year, the enemy army crossed the Yinshan Mountain, and also used the roads and passes in the Yinshan Mountain Range. The mountainous areas around Beiping are even more rugged than the Yin Mountains of the year. Several passes were also extremely steep, which was not conducive to tank movements. As long as a few roads are controlled, it is impossible for the enemy's tank clusters to cross over.

Apart from maintaining tight control over a few highways, no attention has been paid to the mountainous areas around Beiping. The entire defense, except for Xishan, placed most of the troops in Pingbei. As a result, it was taken by surprise again in an area that was still considered impossible to intersperse.

The devil knows how the enemy army managed to penetrate hundreds of tanks from under such a steep mountainous terrain in Pingxi. But for the base camp, it has been slapped before, but it still has no long memory, which is the entire strategic and tactical mistake, which also caused the premature collapse of the Beiping battlefield.

The tactics of the Black Tiger Heart-digging of the Anti-United Nations are indeed powerful. Who would have thought that the enemy army was still in a fierce battle on both flanks, and even they had not yet grasped the initiative in the Pingxi theater. At the risk of being exposed to the enemy on his belly and back, he dared to use the strength of an armored brigade to cross the mountainous area where there was almost no road to use and go straight to the city of Beiping.

All the Japanese troops fighting in the entire Pingxi battlefield were cut off from Beiping City, and the connection between Beiping and Pingnan was severed. This hand also happened to hit the entire Beiping battlefield, the weakness of all the deployments of the North China Front, and it can even be said that the main reason for the complete collapse of the entire Beiping battlefield was here.

Fourth, when the enemy's main force was pinned down on the Pingjin line for a short time, the base camp was too optimistic about the battle situation. Troops were not transferred in time to strengthen the second-line deployment of the Hebei battlefield. If the base camp at that time could transfer the four divisions and regiments that are now transferred to the North China Front, plus the troops that have been sent to the North China Front one after another, they will be transferred to the North China Front as soon as possible.

Even if it is not placed in the Pingjin area, the first-line and second-line defenses will not be strengthened for the time being. If it is deployed in Jizhong as a mobile force and forms a complete defense system with great depth and multiple echelons behind the Pingjin line, then the speed of erosion of the entire battle situation will not be so fast.

The number of enemy tanks is indeed large, and the terrain in Jizhong is indeed suitable for tank interspersed operations. However, as long as a complete defense in depth is formed, its assault force will be weakened layer by layer. Even if the enemy's tanks can't be consumed, it is impossible for the enemy to make such rapid progress in a short period of time.

The fifth and most crucial point. Both the base camp and the North China Front also made the most serious mistake in judging the number of tanks put into the enemy's army. still holds the vision of the Japanese army's logistics and supply, and looks at his opponent who has long been different.

It is believed that under such a long supply line, the number of tanks invested by the enemy in the Hebei battlefield is absolutely not too much. Because after the enemy army entered Hebei, all the oil, ammunition and other materials had to be transferred from North Manchuria. This consumption is impossible for the enemy army to afford.

Therefore, the base camp has always believed that the enemy army is in the Hebei battlefield and will be engaged in tank combat. After all, the Great Plain of Jizhong is the natural best battlefield for tank combat, but the amount invested will definitely not be too much. Because of the terrain of Rehe and Chahar, it will greatly limit the bearing capacity of the enemy's logistical supply lines.

As a result, I didn't expect that people could concentrate tens of thousands of trucks. It not only ensures the supply of materials to the front line without the support of the railway, but also greatly increases the mobility of its own troops. To be honest, when the interspersed troops of the Anti-Japanese Federation appeared in the Jizhong Plain, Uchiyama Eitaro was also taken aback.

Their opponents are all using trucks to maneuver. It not only ensures the mobility of the troops, but also ensures that the troops are not excessively consumed by long-distance marches. The enemy's American-made large-load trucks made Uchiyama Eitaro depressed, and couldn't help but sigh that the enemy army was not what it used to be.

Throwing tens of thousands of trucks into a battlefield was not capable of the Empire, even when it was only facing an opponent of the Nationalist Government. Even the entire Chinese army has a hard time scraping together so many trucks. Without so many trucks, the enemy army simply could not guarantee such a large investment in the Jizhong battlefield. Not to mention anything else, the amount of fuel needed for so many tanks alone crushed the enemy's logistics.

Indeed, the base camp also tried every means to mobilize a large number of tanks for the North China Front. It can even be said that most of the armored strength of the entire Imperial Army was transferred to the North China Front. However, the gap between the performance of the tanks on both sides is too large, and the tactical use is far less proficient than others.

People's tank clusters are prepared for the attack. The armored forces of the North China Front, on the other hand, were prepared for defense and counterattack. In terms of tactics, it can be said that it has fallen behind. Coupled with the gap between the two sides in the use of tank tactics, the Japanese army's own tank units were not able to play at all, and the base camp expected them to play a role.

A series of errors in judgment caused the passivity of the entire situation, and then quickly eroded. The follow-up decision-making of the base camp has again made successive mistakes. The speed of reinforcements is dragging and slowing, knowing that the sea is now unsafe, and not enough reinforcements at one time,

With only one division of reinforcements in his hands, Eitaro Uchiyama can simply be said to be at a loss. It is impossible for such a division to restore public order in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region and ensure the safety behind the Jizhong battlefield, so it still has the ability to rescue the Jizhong battlefield. The damned Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region of the North China Communist Army is simply a pit man.

When a large force passed, except for a few blows of muffled sticks, there was no large-scale interception at all. But as soon as your large army passes, unless you leave a large number of troops behind you to ensure the safety behind you, it will be as if they have come out of the ground. Place the entire rear, stirring into a sloppy mess. Supplies could not be replenished, and the wounded and sick could not be evacuated.

Divisions on the front can only rely on the ammunition they carry, as well as limited air supplies. As for food, it can only be requisitioned. At present, the 64th Division, from the division commander to the soldiers below, can only eat one meal a day. The 22nd Division was even worse, and some squadrons could not even get any replenishment for three days.

The entire Hebei Battlefield Imperial Army is now taking care of one at the expense of the other. If you can take care of the front, you can't take care of the rear. And if too many troops are invested in the rear, then the already insufficient forces on the front line will be even more insufficient. The situation on the front line is bad, and the situation in the back is just as unoptimistic. This kind of war situation is maintained, and you don't have to fight yourself to starve yourself.