At present, the main force of the Anti-United Nations is a 120-mm heavy mortar with main support artillery, and a large number of troops have not been distributed, the captured Japanese Type 92 infantry gun used to be the main support artillery of the Anti-United Nations regimental level. In the previous battles, he achieved quite a good record.

Although at the beginning of this year, after the Anti-Japanese Union replaced the 92nd infantry artillery with the imitation and improvement of the Soviet-made M38 120-mm heavy mortar as the regimental support artillery, the 92-type infantry artillery has all withdrawn from the main force on the front line. But after all, the time for refitting is not long, and the troops are quite familiar with this artillery.

However, under the condition that the number of heavy mortars produced is insufficient, this kind of Japanese-made light infantry artillery is still the main artillery of local troops, or the third batch of divisional units upgraded and formed by local troops before the war, and the main artillery of regimental-level troops. It's just that the main forces formed in the first two batches, especially the divisions formed in the first batch, have been replaced by imitations of Soviet-style 120-mm mortars.

The 3rd Division was the first batch of old main forces to be formed, and all the original 92 infantry guns have been replaced with 120-mm heavy mortars as the main fire support weapons of the original regiment. The 18th Division, which was the second group to form the main division, was not equipped with 92 infantry guns at all, and all the regimental artillery was 120 mm heavy mortars.

As the main suppression artillery at the regimental level, the troops of the 3rd Division, which mainly participated in the war before, are no strangers to the 92nd infantry artillery, and can even be said to be quite familiar. And a considerable number of troops of the 18th Division also used this kind of Japanese-made light infantry artillery when they were armed in the local area.

However, it has only been less than half a year since the rearmament, and the original experience of using the 92 infantry gun has been lost. If these 92 infantry guns can be used to the fullest, they cannot be distributed to every infantry platoon without recoil. It can still be useful to follow the movement of the front-line attacking forces as direct firepower, or to destroy the Japanese anti-tank artillery positions on the anti-slope and open a passage for the tanks.

Although it is not powerful enough, it cannot gnaw at those permanent and semi-permanent fortifications. However, for those large numbers of light and dark forts, which are mainly civil structures or reinforced concrete thickness, and are far less solid than permanent fortifications, they can play a great role. Even if the 92nd infantry gun is still a bit bulky, then it should be possible to use the captured Japanese artillery to clear the minefield.

Moreover, in the case of the extremely large number of Japanese bunkers, the number of 14-mm machine guns used as cover fire was insufficient to be evenly distributed to the first-line attack troops. The same captured Japanese 20-mm anti-tank guns were thrown there, not knowing how to use them. Just a strong request to the superiors to strengthen the fourteen-mm anti-aircraft machine gun as a long-range cover firepower.

The means of opening passages in minefields are too dull, and the tactics of sappers clearing mines a little bit or using artillery fire are still adopted. In the case that the forward attack force was in urgent need of mortar fire support from the 82 and 60 mortars, a large number of shells were spent on mine clearance.

Commanders at all levels had already known that this operation was an interspersed operation without a rear and that the 18th Division had already been dispatched to cut off their own rear routes, and that they could only rely on supplies. However, they would rather use standard equipment that is relatively difficult to replenish ammunition than put these captured weapons with relatively sufficient ammunition into the battlefield.

On the Bayantara line alone, the 3rd Division that participated in the battle captured thousands of rounds of 92 infantry shells, and the shells of the 97-type 20-mm infantry guns and the 37-mm infantry anti-aircraft guns of the Taisho 11 year were even piled up. Although it has not been counted in detail, according to the number of equipment equipped by the Japanese army, it is at least about 2,000 rounds.

The ammunition, which had lost its owner, was scattered almost all over the battlefield of Bayantara, and no one thought to collect it and use it in battle. No one even thought that these lightweight weapons would be used as support firepower to strengthen the front-line attack forces.

This is also the case with the body-barreled artillery of divisional artillery and the 120 heavy mortars of regimental artillery. While a large number of artillery shells were consumed in the minefield for mine clearance, and even affected the attack of the troops, the rocket artillery units hoarded a considerable number of artillery shells because of their limited role in this battlefield environment.

Indeed, the extremely rare large-scale use of mines by the Japanese army in this battle was encountered for the first time in the battle with the Kwantung Army after the Anti-Japanese Union went out of the mountains. The Japanese army, which had always attached little importance to defense, did not attach great importance to mines, which were purely defensive weapons. Standard anti-infantry mines are almost non-existent, and their standard Type 93 anti-tank mines are rarely used.

This time, the direct penetration of the Tongliao and Kailu lines encountered such a large-scale use of various mines by the Japanese army, and it was the first time that the Anti-Japanese Alliance, which had been fighting with the Kwantung Army for many years, encountered it. However, among the mines used by the Japanese army on the front line of Tongliao, except for some of them, they were German-style anti-infantry mines and Type 93 anti-tank mines copied by the Japanese army's Mukden Arsenal. A considerable number of anti-infantry and anti-tank mines are fairly simple alternatives.

Many of the anti-tank mines equipped by the Japanese army on the entire Tongliao battlefield were simply made of tinplate into boxes, and then a few kilograms of TNT explosives were installed, and the instantaneous fuses on the Type 89 grenades used with grenadiers were added, or the collision fuses used by the Type 97 grenades, and some of them were simple mines converted from the trigger fuses on mountain artillery shells.

Many even directly bundled several Type 89 grenades into a bundle, and the middle one was replaced with a Type 97 collision fuse and buried on the ground as an anti-tank mine. It's just that a considerable part of these anti-tank mines, the fuses are not reliable and not very lethal. But blowing up the tracks of the tank, there were no problems.

As for the anti-infantry mines, it is even simpler, many of them are directly filled with some explosives in a canned box, plus the pull fuse of the Type 98 grenade, or the rough pressure fuse of the upper made zuò. Either it was modified with a Type 97 grenade, or a Type 89 grenade grenade.

Although the number of mines laid by the Japanese army was large, the patterns laid by the Japanese army were still too far from those of the Anti-Japanese Union, and there were hardly any tricks planted. A considerable number of mines are simply fused and dropped on the ground, not even covered with a layer of soil as a camouflage.

According to Chen Hanzhang's judgment, the ultimate goal of the Japanese army's minefield was not to kill or injure as many enemy troops, but to force the enemy troops to be exposed to machine gun and artillery fire in the rear for as long as possible. In other words, the real purpose of the Japanese army's anti-infantry mines, except for anti-tank mines, was to delay time and increase the time that the anti-coalition attack force was exposed to its own firepower.

As for real weapons of destruction, light and heavy machine guns and artillery are still relied upon. In other words, the Japanese army only regarded mines as a means, and definitely not as a weapon of destruction, otherwise except for anti-tank mines, the rest of the anti-infantry mines would not have been laid so hastily.

Although these Japanese mines were extremely crude, a considerable number of them were not very reliable. However, together with those core permanent fortifications, as well as the lightweight 37 infantry anti-tank guns and 20-mm infantry anti-tank guns, they became the most threatening equipment for this anti-United Nations assault.

However, although the number of these simple mines is large, it is not too difficult to clean up. The Anti-Union uses imitation Soviet-style flamethrowers, as well as captured Japanese-made 100-style flamethrowers, which can open a 30-meter-long passage at a single shot.

No matter what kind of mine it is, it can't withstand a fire. Minesweeping with flamethrowers is a convenient and convenient tactic. If explosives or blasting ropes made of blasting canisters are used, Chen Hanzhang judged that using six blasting canisters to tie them up can open up at least a ten-meter-wide passage at a time.

Even if these blasting cables can't completely destroy the mines, they are basically no problem to disable the crudely made fuses. And making and using these improvised equipment is not too difficult for the troops, but no one can think of it.

When the attacking troops are on the offensive, once they encounter a large minefield covered by cross-machine gun fire, they know how to call for artillery fire behind them to clear mines. Not only did Lang spend a lot of shells, but it also directly affected the attack efficiency of the troops, delaying a lot of time.

For Chen Hanzhang, the rare and large minefield deployed by the Japanese army in this battle, covering almost the entire theater of operations, was just an accident. The large number of Japanese anti-tank guns and machine guns on the Tongliao front line was also a rather surprising thing for the entire attacking force. The armament of the Japanese army with machine guns and anti-tank weapons on the front line of Tongliao far exceeded the establishment of a division of the Japanese army.

Among them, although the number of the Japanese Army's 94-type 37 rapid-fire guns was not much, it did not exceed the number of field divisions of the Japanese army. However, the number of 37 infantry anti-aircraft guns and 97 Type 20 mm automatic guns was beyond his expectations. Just from the large number of captures on the Bayantala front, which is one direction of the entire battlefield, it can be seen that the number of Japanese troops equipped is far beyond imagination.

These modest anti-tank guns were not able to penetrate the improved Soviet-made tanks of the Anti-Union in the front. But starting from the flanks and the rear is still quite powerful. In particular, the use of artificially created soil slopes makes it quite powerful to shoot continuously at close range when the anti-United Nations tanks climb over and expose the weakest chassis. Moreover, it is designed from the side rear direction at close range, which can penetrate the engine with weak armor.

Chen Hanzhang, who had never been able to figure out where the Japanese army in front of him had obtained so many of them, far exceeded the normal number of anti-tank weapons. It was not until the end of the First Battle of Bayantara, when a Japanese lieutenant squadron leader was captured, and five 37 infantry anti-aircraft guns marked with the words Mukden Arsenal and 1930 on the top were captured.

As a strategic point in the depth of the Japanese army's war against the Soviet Union in Western Manchuria, in order to deal with the Soviet tank cluster after the First World War of Nomenhan. The quantity and quality of the anti-tank guns produced by themselves could not meet the needs, the production of the latest rapid-fire guns was slow, and it was impossible to distribute troops in large quantities in a short period of time.

In addition to establishing a large-scale equipment and ammunition reserve depot in Tongliao that had stockpiled quite a lot of combat-ready weapons, the Kwantung Army transferred the weapons of the Northeast Army, mainly artillery and machine guns, that had been stockpiled and captured during the September 18 Incident, to a part of the Tongliao garrison for use as storage and garrison firepower in fortified areas.

In the eyes of the Kwantung Army, although these old guns were behind the times in terms of range and power. However, at close range, it can be used as an infantry support gun, or as an anti-tank gun. If a Shanghai-made 75-millimeter mountain shell hits a tank at close range, even if it cannot be destroyed, the shock will also kill the crew inside.

In particular, the 14-year-old 77-millimeter field artillery copied by the Northeast Army was captured, and its power was quite good. And its maximum firing range of 11,000 meters even exceeds that of the Japanese army's standard Type 38 field artillery. Although it lacks a standard armor-piercing projectile, it fires ordinary grenades without any problems in destroying Soviet tanks at close range.