When the Anti-Japanese Union was difficult to maintain due to the excessive consumption of road transportation, it could only weaken the strength of the army in the West Manchurian region. And after the Kwantung Army was replenished by the country, would it be very difficult to recover Ximanchu at that time? Fighting strength and sustained combat capability, the Anti-United Nations is far inferior to the Kwantung Army with the support of Japan mainland and South Manchurian industry.

Although Umezu Mijiro is considered to be the most capable of the entire Kwantung Army's previous chief of staff, Yoshimoto Sadachi's vision is still not free from the shackles of the traditional concept of the Japanese army. Although his judgment is quite reasonable, it is a bit too paranoid to take the Japanese concept and consider the actions of his opponent.

For the Japanese army, whose mechanization capability is still quite low and the replenishment of strategic materials is mainly dependent on railways, the general battlefield cannot be 250 kilometers away from the main railway trunk line. Once it exceeds 250 kilometers, it can be maintained for a short time. But if you get into a situation of long-term operations, then the replenishment of materiel will be in trouble.

This is also the main reason why the Kwantung Army concentrated its main forces in the East Manchurian region, where the railways were more dense, and only one 23rd division was left on the West Manchurian battlefield. The reason is nothing more than the entire southern part of the West Manchurian region, from South Xing'an in the north, to Chifeng in the south, and to the vast area of Tongliao in the east, and there is not even a single meter of railway line.

Without railways and water transportation on both sides of the Yangtze River in the Kannai battlefield, the Japanese would not be able to maintain a large number of garrisons with their tactical supply capabilities. In fact, if you open the map of China after the July 7 Incident, it is not difficult to find that the Japanese occupied areas for most of the time during the Anti-Japanese War were maintained along the Tianjin-Pudong Railway, both sides of the Yangtze River and the coastal zone.

The reason why they did not continue to the west after occupying Yichang was because once the Yangtze River shipping and railway lines were detached, their supply capacity dropped by more than one grade, and they were simply unable to maintain large-scale combat capabilities. They can grab food, but where can you grab ammunition and other military supplies.

Don't think that the Japanese in World War II really didn't have much appetite, and it was enough to occupy the most developed areas of southeastern China. Don't think that the Japanese will really take too much into account the interests of the United States and Britain and dare not completely occupy China. The reason why they put the farthest distance of their westward advance for a long time in Yichang and were unable to continue westward was because after Yichang was the Three Gorges.

The Three Gorges, which are still known as the Ghost Gate Pass, and especially the Xiling Gorge, which is full of rapids and rapids, have limited the use of the Japanese Navy. The steep mountains of Wushan on both sides of the river made it impossible for the Japanese army to maintain a supply line at all, and at the same time limited the movement of its already small mechanized and heavy artillery units.

Rely on naval supplies? The Chinese army does not have to make painstaking deployments, as long as a few artillery batteries are deployed along the Three Gorges and all the navigation beacons along the river are removed, it is enough to block the ships of their navy in the Three Gorges. The Three Gorges is not Nanjing, where their 10,000-ton ships can go up, and it is not Wuhan, where Japanese light cruisers can pass through ships.

The Three Gorges and many areas of western China, where there are no simple roads, were like a barrier, firmly blocking the Japanese army's attempt to continue its westward advance. Just kidding, Shu is difficult and difficult to go to the sky, this sentence is not just for the Chinese. When China withdrew westward into Sichuan, even if there were people familiar with the waterways to guide the way, how many ships and supplies were lost in the Three Gorges?

Not only in Yichang, but also in Shaanxi and Hunan. The mountains in the west are endless, and there is a lack of favorable lines of communication. As a result, the supply dependence on the railway line and water transportation was quite large, and the Japanese army, which could fight in the short term without the railway line, and it was difficult to hold on to the long-term war, even if it wanted to completely destroy China, could only hold back.

As for the northwest direction, it is still far inferior to the central south. The Yellow River is not the Yangtze River. Japanese warships on the Yangtze River could go up to Yichang and penetrate deep into the larger tributaries of the Yangtze River, such as the Han River, the Xiang River, and the Gan River, and even Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake. The Yangtze River was large enough to support the Japanese army to fight in the section of the river below Yichang, within a few hundred kilometers of the perimeter of both banks. Its small ships take some risks, and from time to time they can also go deep into the Three Gorges.

However, the northwest is not good, the water volume of the Yellow River makes it impossible for large ships to go too deep, not to mention, a Sanmenxia that has been known as the Yellow River Ghost Gate Pass since ancient times is enough to block even the small ships of the Japanese army. Without supplies and effective roads, tanks and heavy artillery could not move.

Without the support of tanks and heavy artillery, is it true that all Japanese soldiers are immortals with one enemy and one hundred? Although the Chinese army lacks weapons and is tactically backward, it does not lack courage. If they really fought without the support of heavy weapons, the Japanese might not be able to achieve much success.

Therefore, the offensive against the Japanese is not difficult to judge and the deployment of troops, it is not difficult to judge. As long as we ponder both sides of the railway line, we can analyze the approximate deployment of the Japanese army, especially the deployment of heavy groups, in most of the time. This is what it was like on the Kannai battlefield, and it's still like this in the Northeast.

Before the Anti-Japanese Union went out of the mountains, the Kwantung Army, which was clamoring to advance north all day long, deployed troops far higher than those in West Manchuria in East Manchuria, where the railway density was much higher than that in West Manchuria. It is because their logistical supply is inseparable from the railway. Without the railway, they simply could not afford to fight for a long time. Prior to this campaign, the deployment of troops of the Kwantung Army was also carried out according to this standard.

The farthest distance of the main heavy army group is not more than 300 kilometers around the railway line, and the entire West Manchurian army starts from Wangye Temple in the north and reaches the Chifeng line in the south, and one and a half divisions and regiments are placed. Even if a 51st Division was suddenly added before the war, the strength of the entire depth was quite limited.

In the entire West Manchurian region, from the south of Wangye Temple to the territory of Linxi, there is almost no Japanese army in the vast area. If it weren't for the fact that he had figured out this characteristic of the Japanese army's operations, how could Yang Zhen have transferred Wang Guangyu's troops to fight in the rear, cut hundreds of kilometers into Linxi in Outer Mongolia, and hit the entire Western Manchurian Japanese army with one fist?

If the Japanese army had the battlefield support capability of the US army, or even the battlefield support capability of the German army, as well as the ability to maneuver quickly, Yang Zhen would not dare to take this risk. In the north, where fierce fighting is still raging, dare to break away from the supply line for hundreds of kilometers with a cluster of reinforced infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and an armored brigade to break through alone?

Yang Zhen dared to do this, aiming at the Japanese army's lack of long-term combat capability far from the railway line. In the vast area south of the West Manchu Taosuo Railway, north of Chifeng, and west of Tongliao, only one division and regiment can be guaranteed to fight. If there were more troops, and the Japanese army's tactics would be able to replenish their capabilities for a short time, but after a long time, his troops would go hungry.

As long as Wang Guangyu can solve the 23rd Division in a short period of time, and Chen Hanzhang can penetrate to the Tongliao line on schedule, so that the Kwantung Army has no time to take care of too much on the Linxi battlefield, Wang Guangyu will have almost no danger there. The Kwantung Army, which lacked trucks, did not have the ability to maintain too many troops far from the railway line.

As long as the 51st Division is solved, although the supply line is longer, it can be regarded as opening up the supply to Wang Guangyu. Then use the Xinjing battlefield to drag down part of the Kwantung Army's troops, so that it is hesitant to adjust its deployment, and it is impossible to mobilize a large number of reinforcements to Ximan in a short period of time. In this way, it is equivalent to laying two wedges in Ximan, so that the Japanese army cannot swallow it and cannot drive it away.

The weakness of the Japanese army's tactical supply ability relying too much on the railway was used and exerted to the extreme by Yang Zhen in this battle. And for the Kwantung Army, it was also a fatal weakness. Even the 14th Division, which was later transferred to Tongliao, was unable to get rid of this factor and did not leave the railway line.

In fact, if the 14th Division deploys the main force to Kailu, only one wing will be placed on the Tongliao battlefield. The role of response and support for the Linxi battlefield will be greater. And the terrain there is also more conducive to perseverance. However, Kailu was not open to the railway, and the Kwantung Army could not afford to maintain the supply of the 14th Division for a long time.

The rest of the troops were also almost entirely deployed near the railway line. Because of the road transportation capacity of the Japanese army, it was difficult to maintain the materials needed for the operation of the large corps for a long time at a distance of more than 250 kilometers from the railway. Once the time of carrying supplies is exceeded, and it is difficult to raise supplies on the spot in the area, the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army will decline extremely quickly.

Even if the grain can be requisitioned and distributed on the spot, that is, robbed. However, there is no way to replenish ammunition and other supplies. It was with this point of view that Yoshimoto believed that the Anti-Alliance, which relied entirely on imported fuel sources, would be more difficult to support logistical supplies if a large number of troops were maintained in Nishiman for a long time.

Because of the vast area of the entire West Manchuria, except for the Taosuo Railway in the north and some routes of the Zhengtao Railway and Taoqi Railway in Shuangliao that can be used by the Anti-Union, there are no other railway lines in the depth of the west that can be used by the Anti-United Nations. The distance from the railway line is far more than 300 kilometers.

Although the war was over, the supply of the Anti-Japanese Union could be transported directly to Tongliao by railway, but a large number of trucks were required to go west. Even if the number of trucks is sufficient, but the road conditions in Ximan, as well as the oil that relies entirely on imports, can meet the needs of the anti-United Nations? In the absence of such capabilities in the Kwantung Army, Yoshimoto Sadachi did not think that the Anti-Japanese Federation could meet this standard.

This situation was simply untenable for the Kwantung Army. And Yoshimoto Sadachi, who is accustomed to treating others with his own and thinks that his potential for sustained war far exceeds that of the Anti-Japanese Union. Naturally, they also believed that their sustained combat capability was far inferior to their resistance to the United Nations, and they could not maintain the long-term operation of the large corps in the West Manchurian region.

The vast area of West Manchuria, coupled with poor transportation conditions, if a large number of garrisons were to be maintained, a large number of trucks would be needed to ensure logistical supplies. This kind of consumption is difficult to bear for the Kwantung Army, which has a weak industrial base, not to mention the resistance to the United Nations, which has the support of modern industry behind it. Otherwise, the Kwantung Army would not have placed only one 23rd Division in the entire vast area of West Manchuria.

Even if the Anti-Japanese Union now occupies the entire West Manchuria, the huge attrition of modern warfare makes them doomed to be unable to deploy a large number of troops in West Manchurian for a long time. Unless they turn all their road transport forces to West Manchuria. But if that happens, they themselves will be dragged down by huge fuel consumption.

What's more, as long as the Kwantung Army replenishes a sufficient number of aircraft, it will restore the vitality of the air force and hold the line of Lishu. Then the Zhengtao Railway, which is very close to Lishu and serves as an important part of the West Manchurian transportation line of the Anti-Japanese Union, as well as the connecting section between the Dazheng Railway and the Zhengtao Railway, are also within the range of the Kwantung Army's fire control at any time.

The Kwantung Army could cut off this railway line at any time as long as it wished. And without this railway line, it is a question whether the existing transportation capacity of the Anti-Union can ensure basic consumption. Yoshimoto did not believe that the Anti-Japanese Federation had the strength to meet the needs of a large number of garrisons in Western Manchuria by road transportation alone. In his opinion, it may be possible for a short time, but the threat of confrontation is the most deadly after a long time.