Employing this tactic requires a large number of troops, especially armored forces. If this kind of big detour is implemented, the troops that need to be invested are not just a Fengtian battlefield. There are also eastern and southern fronts, and even the western front, which have to devote a large number of troops to serve as a strategy and support.

But what the Anti-Japanese Union lacks most now is sufficient troops to meet this strategic need. Especially in the case that the frontal assault also contained a large number of armored troops, unless all the tank units on the Western Front were transferred back, Yang Zhen would not be able to come up with enough armored forces to implement this strategy.

Despite this tactic, it has proven extremely successful on the Soviet-German battlefield. But the Japanese army was not the Soviet army, and the Anti-Japanese Army was not the German army. Not only can the strength of the Anti-Japanese Union not be compared with the huge mechanized armored group of the German army, but it is also a fledgling armored force, and it is also too far behind the German army in the use of various armored tactics.

So although it is a lot more difficult, the most critical issue that makes Yang Zhen give up this idea. He still thinks that his own troops are not yet capable of carrying out this kind of large-depth and detour tactics. Armored forces, in particular, do not yet have such capabilities. During this campaign, a large number of shortcomings and faults were exposed in the operations and operations of the armored forces.

Although these shortcomings are now covered up by the results of the battle, as the highest military commander of the whole army, it is impossible for Yang Zhen, who only sees the superficial brilliance and turns a blind eye to the problems covered up by the brilliance. I am still keenly aware that although the scale of the armored forces of the Anti-Japanese Federation is not small, there are many problems that need to be solved urgently, both in terms of establishment and command.

If the problems that have been exposed are not solved, the armored units will not be able to bear the needs of such a large-depth and circuitous operation, at least for a short period of time. Whether or not a unit can play its greatest role on the battlefield is definitely not just a question of whether or not the equipment meets its needs.

It is more about whether the use of tactics can meet the needs and whether the military quality and theory of commanders at all levels are sufficient. To put it bluntly, it is whether the ability can match the needs of the development of the situation. But the performance of the current armored forces cannot meet this need in Yang Zhen's eyes.

This is not only the performance of the armored forces participating in the Northeast Battlefield, but also not as Yang Zhen originally expected. And even if Chen Hanzhang personally commanded it on the Western Front, that large-depth and roundabout interspersed operation and the subsequent interspersed operation. In the course of the operation, many weaknesses and shortcomings were also exposed.

In Chen Hanzhang's interspersed operations, if it were not for the concentration of tank troops to climb over the Yinshan Mountains and the dangers, they would have penetrated directly into Suinan from places beyond the imagination of the Japanese army, and achieved the overall strategic intention of surprise. Moreover, the main forces of the Mongolian Xinjiang Army deployed by the Japanese army in the Suiyuan area were all transferred, and the entire vast area from Datong to Baotou was seriously insufficient. created a prerequisite for Chen Hanzhang's raid.

This enables the armored forces invested on the Western Front to achieve their strategic goals in a short period of time. Judging from the very serious problems that have been exposed, it is not known what the outcome of the war would have been if there were no such prerequisites. The large-scale detour of armored forces is not a new topic for the current world military theory.

But for the Anti-Union, it is still a completely new field. There is still a long way to go before the Anti-United Nations can truly master and skillfully use the assault and application of armored clusters. Commanders at all levels of the anti-coalition armored corps still need to be tempered for a long time before they can truly be handy on the battlefield.

In addition, the density of Japanese troops around Siping is far greater than that of Suinan at the beginning. and the size of the forces that the Japanese army could commit to the subsequent battlefields in South Manchuria. Moreover, Liaodong far exceeds the mountainous terrain limit of the width of Yinshan Mountain, which is not very suitable for large-scale long-distance raids and interspersed by armored troops.

And without the participation of armored forces, the infantry, which could not be equipped with even heavy artillery, was interspersed in a separate roundabout. Not only is the speed of progress slowed down by the speed of infantry, but also the ability to attack fortifications. Even the troops invested are far beyond what the Anti-United Nations can bear.

Therefore, through overall consideration, as early as the implementation of the Harvester plan, Yang Zhen gave up the tactic of concentrating tanks on the relatively weak flanks of the Japanese army. In the end, it became an inevitable choice to decide to fight a quick battle, and to retreat immediately as long as the goal of the campaign was achieved.

In addition, if the Kwantung Army is crippled now and all of the Northeast is recovered, it is not in the strategic interests of the Anti-Japanese Federation and even the whole of China. Now that the Kwantung Army has been disabled, judging from the importance of South Manchuria's overall war layout of the Japanese army, this battle will inevitably attract Japanese troops from other strategic directions.

In this way, on the contrary, among the entire war front against Japan, the weakest self has undertaken the heaviest combat duties. That is to say, the weakest resistance to the United Nations has to resist the main force of the entire Japanese army, as well as the heaviest offensive. This is undoubtedly the current anti-union, and it is absolutely unbearable.

The Japanese could choose to abandon the invasion of Australia, and they could choose to abandon the attack on India. However, the Japanese would never choose to give up South Manchuria, or even the entire Chinese battlefield. If the Japanese had been able to spit out some of the meat they had swallowed, then perhaps the entire Pacific War would not have really been fought.

Once the Japanese base camp was in danger of believing that South Manchuria really could not hold it, they would immediately mobilize heavy troops to return to the northeast. Then for the living forces, which have suffered many casualties and the loss of combat effectiveness has almost reached the peak, it will be a catastrophe.

Not to mention that the Anti-United Nations is only a part of many aspects on the battlefield in China. Even the whole of China now does not have the ability to bear the burden of shifting the strategic focus of the Japanese army on all fronts. It did not have the strength to compete with the Japanese army, which had already reached several million in size, but it was able to compete in an all-round way.

The Japanese troops on various battlefields now are not the Japanese troops after the July 7 Incident. At that time, Japan did not carry out a general mobilization because of the war of aggression against China. Although the scale of the Japanese army's investment in the Chinese battlefield was huge, it always controlled as much as possible to avoid affecting the normal economic order at home and shaking the national strength.

In other words, until the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese could only be regarded as half of their bodies on the Chinese battlefield at most. Far from being mobilized in general, the mainland has not reduced its investment in the navy and other areas despite the need to maintain a large army.

There is even the energy and ability to ensure continued investment in the Northeast. It is obvious that the Japanese do not want to hold back the normal economic development and life of the country for the sake of China. At the same time, the complex terrain and the rather impoverished western part of China also prevented the Japanese army's desire to continue to advance westward.

After the addition of general mobilization, the inevitable damage to national strength, as well as Japan's relatively weak national strength, are also destined to not be in a state of general mobilization for a long time. Therefore, for the Japanese army with a limited degree of mobilization, although China fought extremely hard, it could barely bear the strategy of exchanging space for time.

However, once the general mobilization is completed, the number of troops and strength that Japan has invested on the battlefield in China will definitely not be something that China, let alone the Anti-Japanese Alliance, can bear. Now that the Japanese have partially completed their mobilization and their strength is greatly expanded, once they abandon other fronts and devote themselves to China, the current stalemate on the Chinese battlefield will be completely broken.

Moreover, shortening the duration of the war will certainly reduce the sacrifices of the Chinese nation and shorten the suffering of the Chinese people, but it will have a considerable impact on the efforts to win aid from the United States and Britain. For his own plan, which is still mostly on paper, can have a fatal effect.

This is not Yang Zhen's selfishness, and it is not that he is consciously preserving his strength. In addition to the fact that the Anti-Japanese League had no strength, it was completely defeated and annihilated by the entire South Manchurian Japanese army. The most fundamental thing is that the sacrifice and suffering paid by the Chinese in this war, whether they can obtain actual gains, does not mean how much lost territory is recovered on the battlefield, and how much trauma caused by the war is reduced.

Is it possible to exchange for the real rise of the Chinese nation, instead of staying in a weak country that is only on paper, people and want to cut off a piece of meat, but they can only open their mouths to protest. National strength determines national fortunes, and truly building a strong China is not as simple as moving your mouth.

Although this war has brought countless hardships to the Chinese nation, it has also brought the Chinese a real chance to rise. It's just that in the period of history that Yang Zhen knew, the political situation in China at that time did not fully take advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, the Nationalist Government is not capable of undertaking the ability to make China truly take off and build China into a truly powerful country.

What Yang Zhen wants is not what he has mastered, which is quite strong on the surface, but extremely weak in nature, in fact, no one takes you seriously at all, relying on the gifts of others to get the name of a so-called big country. A weak fat man, a so-called great power that is divided by others, but the actual situation is not really much better than before the war.

After the September 18 Incident, China lost Northeast China, and after the end of the Anti-Japanese War, it permanently lost Outer Mongolia, but it did not even have the right to protest. Such a weak country is useless for Yang Zhen at all. Now he would rather bear the infamy than go on unswervingly. Because if his country is really strong, it will be a China that all foreign enemies will not dare to underestimate.

Therefore, Yang Zhen believes that if he does his best now, it will fundamentally weaken Japan's fundamental potential to maintain the war, and from the perspective of his overall plan, it will not be a very cost-effective deal for the Chinese. On the battlefield, it can only be the snipe and the clam competing for the fisherman's profit, draining their own blood, so that the United States and Britain can take advantage of it there......

In addition, the Anti-Japanese Federation really does not have that strength at the moment, and it encircled and annihilated the main force of the Kwantung Army in one fell swoop, completely liberating the entire northeast. Even if it was barely defeated, it would not be able to hold it at all under the counterattack of the concentrated forces of the Japanese army. It can even be said that once the living forces are exhausted on the battlefield in South Manchuria, not to mention that South Manchuria cannot be defended, even the original old base area may be difficult to defend.

The rice must be eaten in one bite, and the road must be walked step by step, Yang Zhen also understands this truth. In the current situation of only five taels of stomachs, if you hold on to two catties, you can only pull yourself out. At that time, he had half a pound of stomach and ate eight taels, which was forced by the situation to have no choice. If you are still swallowing so desperately now, then you can only die yourself.

Therefore, in the entire harvester plan, Yang Zhen still chose a quick battle and stopped immediately after achieving the goal, instead of choosing to delay the war. I didn't even think about inserting the Siping line from behind to complete the encirclement of the main force of the Kwantung Army in the Siping direction. For him, this was not just a risk, but a fundamental strategic mistake.

At the beginning, when the timing was favorable, Yang Zhen did not adopt the kind of tactics that Umezu Mijiro feared. At present, the Kwantung Army has suffered a big loss, and after being prepared, he will not take this risk. In Yang Zhen's eyes, some things can only be done once, and it would be stupid to think of doing it again. Repeating a practice again and again, Yang Zhen thinks it is extremely undesirable.