Chapter 635 – Prosecution Cheapness and the Judge's Position

The second advantage of Japanese prosecutors is that they can not prosecute if they believe that criminal responsibility is not necessary to be prosecuted if they are not prosecuted cheaply. In retrospect, this system stems from the objective constraints of the establishment of a public prosecution system in the early Meiji period: the Japanese government during the Meiji Emperor period was not financially adequate, and the operation of the criminal justice system and the maintenance of prisons were quite expensive. For this somewhat embarrassing reason, in 1885, the then Minister of Justice, Hideyoshi Yamada, made it clear in his instructions that the main policy of not filing a case or warning release should be the main policy for minor crimes, and that the prosecution should be reduced as much as possible, and this method did reduce the burden on the state by eliminating the judicial costs of minor crimes. In the course of the revision of the Criminal Procedure Law in 1923, the doctrine of cheap prosecution, which had gradually become dominant in the course of enforcement, finally completely overwhelmed the doctrine of statutory prosecution, and Article 279 explicitly stipulated the provisions of the system of cheap prosecution that were consistent with the existing contents.

In the modern world, although Japan is no longer the poor government of extreme financial constraints, the system has continued - from 1890, when there were 1,500 judges, to the present, the number of judges in Japan has not increased significantly, and only about 1,500 are in charge of legitimate litigation (there are about 800 summary court judges and 350 family court judges, as well as some who have not served for more than five years, As a result, rookie associate judges who cannot become special associate judges with special powers who can sit on separate cases), the total number of judges with less than 3,000 judges is really stretched compared with the total number of suspects who average more than three to four million per year. Without the inquisition doctrine and related systems to divide these cases, each judge would probably have to handle more than 1,000 cases per year.

(For example, at this point in 1994, judges in large cities were responsible for about 300 cases per person, and about 25 new cases were entrusted to judges every month.) At the same time, the law requires each case to be heard at least once a month, which is equivalent to 325 simultaneous cases per month. Judges usually sit three days a week, which means that 25-27 cases need to be heard on each court day, which is why the Hakamata case was already going on for the 17th public trial in September of the following year.)

In such a situation, the doctrine of cheapness of prosecution can greatly relieve the work pressure of the judge system. For example, in 1988, Japan's Public Prosecutor's Office dismissed a total of 2.35 million suspects (more than 80 per cent of whom were road traffic suspects)

And such a system will inevitably bring considerable advantages to the prosecution -- experienced senior prosecutors often screen on the basis of the doctrine of cheapness of prosecution, and specifically choose to prosecute criminal cases in which they have a considerable advantage, and adopt a policy of not prosecuting relatively difficult cases, so that the conviction rate of first-instance criminal trials in court is as high as 99.9% or more.

In contrast, the Anglo-American legal system has a much lower guilt rate, and their judges are clearly aware that the defendant may be innocent – in the UK, the defendant who pleads guilty does not need to go to trial, the judge must hear a case in which the defendant denies his guilt, and the final post-trial acquittal rate is over 60% (64% in 1999). In the United States, courts only formally try defendants who deny the facts of the prosecution, while federal district courts and courts of first instance also have acquittal rates of more than 12 percent.

In this contrast, Japanese judges are almost numb to the defendant's redress: after they have gradually "learned" the "knowledge" that "the defendant is guilty", when they see the new defendant, they will naturally subconsciously think that this must be another prisoner whose prosecutors have sufficient evidence to ensure that he is sent to prison. In the end, even if the prosecutors' evidence has obvious loopholes, they may not be found because they are too trusted, and eventually there will be unjust, false and wrongful convictions.

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Author: Let me give you an example, according to the 2016 Japanese Prosecutor's Statistical Annual Report, the prosecution dealt with a total of 1.12 million people, and in the end, only 320,000 people were selectively prosecuted, and the number of people who were finally acquitted was 104, and the prosecution conviction rate was about 99.97%.

As for the guilt rate in criminal cases...... The total number of people sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment or higher is 55,039, and the total number of acquittals in all prosecutions is 104, and some of them are non-criminal cases, so the final calculation is also very exaggerated.

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And the most important advantage is the judge's position.

What is the purpose of the law?

If it were conservatives, the answer would probably be to protect the people from criminals and give them a clean land.

And if the human rights faction were to answer, it would probably be close to avoiding anyone from falling victim to the powerful organs—of course, given the power advantage of the powerful organs, it would mainly be used to protect the relatively weak defendants.

The two are obviously in conflict at times: for pure conservatives, for example, scapegoats are acceptable – they don't mind pushing a scape out when a murderer with a bad social impact is at large, claiming that it is a prisoner, and putting him to death to appease the population and stabilize society. As long as more people can get more benefits, then sacrificing one person is acceptable.

For the human rights faction, such an idea is clearly heretical – in their view, the law should not be an accomplice to the infringement of personal interests, regardless of the purpose. While this may bring greater societal good, it is also a dangerous sign of state violence against individuals.

As for what the Japanese judge thinks...... Before the Supreme Court's Grand Chamber of Justice in 1966, the legal community was generally leaning towards liberalism, but with this incident as a turning point, the government realized that a considerable number of young judges in the court had joined the human rights group Youth Law Association, which violated the most basic objective and neutral ethics that Japanese judges needed to abide by and had a huge impact.

In other words, the Japanese judiciary today has in fact become a confrontation between prosecutors and judges on one side and defense lawyers and defendants on the other. This is so absurd compared to the fact that the position of judge was originally set up as a "referee". For example, it's like a referee in a soccer match who comes off the pitch and plays for one of the teams.

Under such circumstances, it is self-evident that the prosecution has an excessive advantage, and it is natural that such a successful conviction on weak arguments will occur.

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Author: Personally, I'm definitely still a conservative. For the lesser of two evils, I am willing to take the risk that I myself may be one of the wrongful convictions for the sake of a more deterrent legal system. Or to put it another way, everyone is taking a variety of risks all the time, so why should I stubbornly avoid a particular risk and give up on pursuing a lower overall risk rate?

btw, set the issue.

In addition, the prosecutors and judges are basically set up as conservatives by me (including the execution of Zero, who was baptized as a human rights activist, because that is largely an albino setting adopted to take care of young children, and the conservative background of the 1994 era and the National Police Agency's identity as its own mission to fight against revolutionary groups determined that Amuro was inevitably a conservative, and his position of believing in human rights was tantamount to exposing Japan's chest to all those with ill intentions. )

If you come from a police background, there are both conservatives and human rights factions, and those over the age of 35 and those with bureaucratic backgrounds are basically set as conservatives (including Mori Kogoro), while the male characters who look silly and naïve and all the female characters are set as human rights factions.

The vast majority of lawyers and detectives are human rights activists.

Organized conservatives in all colors.

The bureaucracy is all conservatives.

If you don't have the above backgrounds, the male characters tend to be conservative, and the female characters tend to be human rights.