Louis Loiszo de Grandmaison.

After graduating from the Military Academy with the first grade, he was hailed as a "rare talent in ten years." In less than a year, he was appointed chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff Headquarters and an instructor of the Advanced Military Research Center. Admired by many young generals, he was widely regarded in the army as a very good and charismatic officer, especially in writing and eloquent speeches. More than one senior general said of De Grandmaison: "It is difficult to find a better persuasive man, a man of wisdom, fiery temper and generosity, who is good at inspiring others to think." ”

Just by looking at this part of the resume, you will feel that this is an inspirational story, an example of a young talent who has worked tirelessly to succeed in getting ahead. But if you look at what he preaches, its face immediately becomes an abomination.

Two of the colonel's most famous speeches were "The Critical Nature of the Front and the Concept of (Rear) Security" and "The Pattern of Encounters in Large Forces," and the audience consisted of officers from the General Staff and the Higher Military Academy. Its content can be roughly summarized into the following four points:

First, the offensive must be launched simultaneously on the entire front in order to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy army to make the enemy unable to respond to the successive offensives;

Second, because the enemy forces are unable to respond to such a large number of rapid attacks, the enemy's top brass will have miscommand and it will be difficult to gather forces to launch a counterattack on the flanks of the attacking forces;

Thirdly, the attacking forces in the rapid breakthrough have completely disrupted the enemy's position, and the adjacent troops of their own side no longer need to waste time and troops to maintain the battle line, so that the speed of the attack can be further accelerated;

Fourth, any strategy of fighting and retreating and defending is cowardly and unfeasible.

From a purely military point of view, this was a speech full of positive and enterprising initiative, which was very much in line with the spirit and spirit required by soldiers. From the point of view of national strategy and technology, this is complete nonsense.

At the same time, the rapid breakthrough and logistical support capabilities brought by a high degree of mechanization enable the troops to break through and bypass the enemy's defense line like lightning, carry out a wide range of deep penetration, completely disrupt the enemy's deployment, strike its logistics supply lines, plunge it into chaos and quickly end the war (this is also the essence of the "blitzkrieg"). But what about Charlemagne? Once inside enemy territory, if the railroad network cannot be used (the enemy will inevitably destroy the railroad to delay the intruders), the speed of Charlemagne's army will depend on the speed of the soldiers' feet and the speed of the carriages. On the other hand, the opponent can use the railway and road network still in his hands to carry out internal mobile defense, build a complete new line of defense before Charlemagne's army arrives, and let the exhausted opponent shed his last drop of blood in front of the never-ending trenches.

If the above can be interpreted as a forward-looking thinking that is too ahead of the times, and does not mean to let soldiers give away their heads, then the "Regulations on the Use of Large Troops" drawn up by the chief of the Operations Division has nothing to do with "foresight."

Article 3 of Chapter 1 of the Regulations on the Use of Large Forces states that the kingdom's next wars will be short, and that all strategic battles will be based on the search for a quick solution—and that the following syllogisms are an eye-opener, without mentioning where he got his confidence.

The war does not last long, and only an offensive can ensure victory, so it is necessary to attack and further shorten the war to achieve a quick victory.

Even if the job of the military is defense and war, this is too extreme rhetoric. Considering Charlemagne's current national conditions and international situation, this is fundamentally a declaration of war mania that is divorced from reality.

The following fifth clause further sums up the basic guiding principle of the whole doctrine according to this logic: in order to achieve victory, we must force a breakthrough through the enemy's position, and even if we are bound to suffer heavy casualties, we must not hesitate to attack to achieve a breakthrough. Any other approach would be seen as a departure from the nature of war.

Article 8 is even more straightforward: war is ultimately a spiritual struggle, defeat is inevitable when the hope of victory ceases to exist, and victory does not belong to the side with fewer casualties, but to the side with higher morale and more complete determination.

All in all, for Colonel de Grandmeison, who was full of "offensive worship," any defense, maneuver, and other things that were contrary to the "offensive spirit" and "spiritual power can override matter" were crooked, and his ideal war, the ideal world, was that everyone lined up in a neat queue, constantly attacking, attacking, and attacking, and never distracted, until the great war that killed all the crows of the three thousand worlds.

Such a madman who has never seen a real war, squatting in the office all day drinking real coffee, playing war games with red and blue pencils in front of the map, what he will do, what he can do, can be imagined with his toes.

It is nothing more than a blockbuster on the battlefield and climbing to a higher position by virtue of military exploits.

As for whether the war he conceived was consistent with reality, whether the battle plan would be carried out smoothly, how many people would die for it, and how many families would lose their relatives - those who were in a safe place, instigated and instigated others to go to war, and monopolized their own interests, never thought about it.

In the face of this kind of guy who can be called a portrait of a war maniac, Roland did not even have the strength to pretend to be polite, and only out of a shred of formal respect for the audience and the meeting itself did he speak with a polite gesture.

"The duty of a soldier is to obey orders, and since we have the order to move forward, we will move forward no matter where it is. ”

After a pause, Roland's gaze toward De Grandmaisson sharpened.

"But ambition is not the same as courage, careful planning and preparation are essential conditions to ensure victory. So here are a few questions to ask, first of all – what are the strategic goals of this operation?

The warm atmosphere instantly condensed.

Victory, victory, more victory.

Everyone was shouting like this, hungry for victory.

However, has anyone ever wondered what victory is?

Defeating all opponents is victory? Conquering each other's territory is victory? Trampling the whole world under your feet is victory?

What is the victory, and where is the end?

(The so-called "victory" is relative to the goal, and there is no definite goal, so how can we judge whether we will win or not?) Charlemagne rashly provoked one war after another, what is their goal? What kind of goal do they want to achieve? I am afraid that no one can tell now.) ）

Looking at De Grandmaison, whose cheeks twitched slightly, as if he wanted to say something, Roland couldn't help but shake his head in his heart.

Charlemagne invaded Alfheim, either to gain an advantage in diplomatic negotiations or to resolve the threat around him. The act of breaking the current delicate situation is bound to have a ripple effect on the international community, and whatever the final outcome of the battle, it will only end up in the dilemma of being isolated and surrounded again.

Those who advocated sending troops did not think about this at all.

No.

Not to mention the big strategic issues, some of the more basic tactical issues are also ......

"Where is our army going to advance? Is it to force the enemy to retreat to the east bank of the Rhine, or is it to completely occupy the enemy-occupied area? Is the battle itself long-term or short-term?"

After Roland raised his doubts, the audience's eyes turned to De Grand-Maison. The bureaucrats, in particular, in the financial system, no longer want to hear any words about "long wars" or "wars of attrition," and their eyes are burning with them.

"Short-term operations, of course. ”

Colonel de Grandmaison raised his chin slightly and said condescendingly:

"The defense line that the enemy army is relying on has been completely shattered, as long as our army is driven straight into the city, the rebellious thief army will be frightened and collapse without a fight!!"